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MANDATES

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BY

FREDA WHITE

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LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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Foreword

BY THE RT. HON. SIR FREDERICK LUGARD, G.C.M.G., FORMERLY GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF NIGERIA, BRITISH MEMBER OF THE LEAGUE PERMANENT MANDATES COMMISSION

IT has been said, not without truth, that the weakest point in the Mandatory system is the inability of the Council of the League of Nations (and its delegate the Mandates Commission) to verify the statements contained in the Annual Reports of the Mandatory Powers, and to assure to all the inhabitants of the Mandated territories facilities for appeal in case of violation or neglect of the conditions of the Mandates. A Mandatory naturally wishes to present in the most favourable light the account of its stewardship, and to disarm criticism. Its account will of course be the literal truth as it presents itself to it, but perhaps not quite the whole truth. Its point of view may lead it to omit mention of facts which in its honest opinion are not worthy of mention, but of which the Mandates Commission would form a different estimate.

In my judgment this disability is inherent in any system of International Supervision, for no first-class Power would accept a mandate if its prestige and influence with the subject races were imperilled, and its 'bona-fides' impugned by anything approaching espionage and direct intervention by the nominees of the League. It has, for instance, been suggested that the League might appoint its own Consuls in Mandated territories. Possibly in the further future this suggestion may be brought forward for consideration, but under present conditions it would afford very serious opportunities for friction, if, for instance, the Consul's report differed, as it obviously would some-

times differ, from that of the Mandatory. Nor would it be easy to find men well qualified for the post, who would not at the same time excite apprehension by the mere fact of their nationality.

Another suggestion, viz. that the Permanent Mandates Commission itself (or a Committee of its members) should visit a Mandated territory, in order to inquire into charges or alleged grievances by dissentient sections of the population, was actually deemed worthy of discussion in the seventh Session of the Commission. It is open to the same objection as the former suggestion, viz. that a Mandatory would be placed in an intolerable position if its policy and methods were liable at any time to be publicly discussed on the spot between a body of gentlemen from Geneva, and those sections who were hostile to the Administration and wished to air their grievances or to ventilate their theories. Moreover, it is, I imagine, outside the competence of the Mandates Commission – which is a purely advisory body to the Council – to take such action. It lies with the Council in case of any exceptional crisis, or at the request of the Mandatory – as in the case of General Laidoner's mission to Mosul – to select its own Commissioner.

The Mandates Commission must therefore rely on the individual knowledge and experience of its Members, aided by such persons or Societies as may make it their business to watch over the welfare of Backward Races, to read between the lines of reports, and to elicit full information from the accredited representative of the Mandatory Power.

The sole compelling power and driving force which the Commission can exert is the force of the public opinion of

the world – and indeed in most cases the same may be said of the League itself. For this reason it is desirable to cultivate interest in the proceedings of the Commission and to circulate widely the Minutes of its Sessions, and its report to the Council, so that public opinion may be well-informed. The Secretariat is in turn charged with the duty of collecting and distributing to Members, the comments, suggestions and criticisms of the Parliaments and the Press of the World, to indicate to the Commission any points that may have escaped their attention, and to stimulate them in their work.

All who are interested in the success of this attempt to effect some sort of supervision over the administration of the territories for which the Allies assumed responsibility after the War will welcome such careful studies as that presented by Miss White, alike of the principles governing the Mandate system, and of its practical application in the fourteen territories held by the various Powers under Mandate. In doing me the honour to invite me to write a brief Foreword to her book, she has not of course asked me to endorse either her statement of facts or her personal opinions. With the latter in some cases I do not find myself in entire accord – and indeed in handling so complex a subject, and in reviewing the results achieved by each Mandatory, it goes without the saying that views and judgments will differ.

There have been many essays and learned disquisitions, especially by American writers, on such issues as the nature and extent of the Sovereignty exercised by a Mandatory – the legal status of the inhabitants of a Mandated territory, and the like – but I know of no popular treatise covering the ground which Miss White has chosen,

and I trust that her work may have a good effect in stimulating public interest in this subject. For these territories held under Mandate constitute a very onerous responsibility. In area they are equal to a third of Europe; their inhabitants number about twenty millions in varying stages of human development, but for the most part they are Backward Races, whose welfare has been declared by the Allies to be a 'sacred trust of civilization.'

The useful bibliography at the end of the book will enable those who desire information of a more technical kind to ascertain the sources from which to seek for it.

'The principles to be applied are these: that peoples and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.'

PRESIDENT WILSON'S ADDRESS TO CONGRESS, 11.2.18

The War and the Empires.

THE World War of 1914 to 1918 was a breaker of Empires. Its end saw the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian Empires shattered into fragments, the Arab territories of Turkey and the colonies of Germany in the hands of the Allies. More than that, the War, in a sense, broke the idea of Empire. By this is meant not the characteristic British conception – for it is unique – but the much more common continental theory of an enormous territorial aggregate governed by a centralized bureaucracy in the interests of a 'ruling race.'

Every one who remembers the War knows the fundamental importance of its opposed ideas. Of course, the issues were far more complex than were ever voiced in the 'slogans' of politicians about war aims. None the less, these slogans inspired the peoples and the ordinary fighting ranks to the struggle. It is of the stuff of history, now, that the side which cried 'No annexations' and 'The liberty of small nations,' was able to endure till the end, and to enlist the aid even of the remote, disinterested Americas; while the side which stressed loyalty and obedience to efficiency found alien subject races breaking away and crumbled inwardly. The significance of the war faiths, moreover, survived the fighting; and with the defeat of its protagonists the belief that one race is justified in

imposing government upon another for strategic reasons, or by virtue of a superior civilization, was on the scrap-heap as a creed outworn. Empires indeed continued to exist, but their rulers were fain to use another language.

The Post War Alternatives.

Then came the Peace Conference and the need to face what was to be done with the broken Empires. In Europe, despite frontier difficulties, the solution was fairly clear. The peoples detached from Germany, Russia and Austria were either united to States of their own race already in being, or given independence. In either case it was assumed that with the safeguard of Minority Treaties they could look after themselves. But there remained the Arab lands at the Eastern end of the Mediterranean, Mesopotamia and German Colonies in Africa and the Pacific. One of three things might have happened to those countries.

They might have been restored to their former rulers. But this was impossible, because the natives in every case had been induced to favour the Allied cause, and in some cases to fight for it, by the promise of freedom from their old and heavy yoke. Moreover, at the Peace Conference there was a strong reluctance on the part of the conquerors to allow their military successes to go unrewarded.

They might have been given independence. But to leave the Arabs, kept helpless by secular misrule, to their own devices, would have meant their speedy reconquest by Turkey. Still less could native tribes of the German colonies be left to the exploitation of the white trader and planter without the protection of white government.

They might have been distributed among the Allied and Associated Powers as the spoils of victory. This would have been done after any previous war. But the Allies had always said 'No annexations.' In January, 1918, President Wilson, in the Fourteen Points which were the basis of the Armistice, stipulated for an equal consideration of the interests of the colonial populations with the claims of the government proposed to rule them, and also for an 'absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development' for the nations freed from Turkey. Besides, the old idea of Empire was discredited, and none dared voice it plainly any more.

Here was a dilemma. It was General Smuts, it seems, who was first able to solve it. Before the Peace Conference, in his book, *The League of Nations, Practical Suggestions*, he wrote: 'The only compromise I make' (with the principle of racial autonomy) 'and make partly to conciliate the Great Powers and partly in view of the administrative inexperience of the League at the beginning, is the concession that, subject to the authority and control of the League, which I mean to be real and effective, suitable Powers may be appointed to act as Mandatories of the League in the more backward peoples and areas. That compromise will, I hope, prove to be only a temporary expedient.'

This suggestion was intended to apply to the African areas.

The Peace Conference Solution.

At the Peace Conference, the future of the conquered lands was discussed by a Committee of the Allied Dele-

gations appointed to deal with the Turkish and colonial questions, and also by the authors of the Covenant.

The main results of these deliberations were Article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles, and Article 22 of the Treaty and of the Covenant of the League of Nations. It is notable that by Article 119 the sovereignty over Germany's colonies passes to the Allies collectively. It runs:

'Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.'[1]

The ground was thus cleared for the application of the Mandatory system outlined in Article 22. That article embodied, in the view of the peacemakers, two main principles. The first was that while the administration of the countries involved should be subject to international supervision, the government of each should be carried out by a single State. This lesson was drawn from sad experience in various corners of the earth already languishing under the mutually jealous officials of international régimes. The second principle was that a very broad statement of responsibility of the ruling Powers could be formulated to cover all the Mandates. But the differences between the territories were so great that even in the brief summary of a Covenant Article they had to be described in three classes. At length, then, with the Treaty, was signed the charter of a new enterprise in government:

[1] The later Treaty of Lausanne of July, 1923, contains boundary clauses by which Turkey renounces her Arab lands to 'the parties concerned.' In 1919, however, those territories were already in effective occupation of the Allies, and had to be ruled, Treaty or none.

Article 22 [Mandatories. Control of Colonies and Territories]

'To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant.

The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League.

The character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions and other similar circumstances.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.

Other peoples, especially those of Central Africa, are at such a stage that the Mandatory must be responsible

for the administration of the territory under conditions which will guarantee freedom of conscience and religion, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, the prohibition of abuses such as the slave trade, the arms traffic and the liquor traffic, and the prevention of the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory, and will also secure equal opportunities for the trade and commerce of other Members of the League.

There are territories, such as South-West Africa and certain of the South Pacific Islands, which, owing to the sparseness of their population, or their small size, or their remoteness from the centres of civilization, or their geographical contiguity to the territory of the Mandatory, and other circumstances, can be best administered under the laws of the Mandatory as integral portions of its territory, subject to the safeguards above-mentioned in the interests of the indigenous population.

In every case of mandate, the Mandatory shall render to the Council an annual report in reference to the territory committed to its charge.

The degree of authority, control, or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory shall, if not previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, be explicitly defined in each case by the Council.

A permanent Commission shall be constituted to receive and examine the annual reports of the Mandatories and to advise the Council on all matters relating to the observance of the mandates.'

MANDATE	MANDATORY	CLASS	EX-RULER
Iraq	Great Britain	A	Turkey
Syria & Lebanon	France	A	Turkey
Palestine & Trans-Jordan	Great Britain	A	Turkey
Tanganyika	Great Britain	B	Germany
Ruanda-Urundi	Belgium	B	Germany
British Togo	Great Britain	B	Germany
British Cameroons	Great Britain	B	Germany
French Togo	France	B	Germany
French Cameroons	France	B	Germany
South-west Africa	Union of S. Africa	C	Germany
New Guinea	Australia	C	Germany
Samoa	New Zealand	C	Germany
South Sea Islands	Japan	C	Germany
Nauru	British Empire (Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand)	C	Germany

Some explanation is needed of the allocation of the Mandates, and of the classes A, B and C, into which this table divides them. It is simplest to describe both in inverse order. As it happened the remotest ex-colonies of Germany were easier to allot than regions nearer to Europe, and their rulers and mandatory constitutions were settled earlier.

The ugly but convenient classification A, B, and C dates from the Peace Conference. As the table shows, the A areas are the Arab ex-Turkish possessions in Asia; the B, tropical African lands; the C, the Pacific islands, and, on account of contiguity with the Union, South-west Africa.

Allocation.

The Peace Treaties, as has been pointed out, surrender the territories to the victorious Allies. The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, collectively, are thus their legal owners or sovereigns; and the mandatory system, viewed from one angle, consists of a double delegation of this sovereignty; to the League as supervisor, and to the several Mandatories as administrators. This singular condition accounts for the part played in their history of the Allied Supreme Council and the United States. The Supreme Council allocated the African and Pacific mandates at the Peace Conference in May, 1919. The areas were, generally speaking, given to the rule of the country nearest to them. Thus German South-west Africa fell to the Union of South Africa, New Guinea to Australia, Samoa to New Zealand. An exception was Nauru, a tiny islet so valuable commercially that three parts of the British Empire (Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia) agreed to hold it jointly. The actual division of Togo and the Cameroons between Great Britain and France was left to the two Powers to settle later between themselves. It was afterwards, also, that Belgium claimed, in consideration of her share in the conquest of German East Africa, and obtained with Great Britain's consent a mandate for two native kingdoms called Ruanda and Urundi marching with the Belgian Congo.

The A mandates, Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, and Mesopotamia, were not allotted till the San Remo Conference of the Supreme Council of April, 1920. The disposal of the Arab lands of Turkey was in itself very difficult, and the situation was not eased by the various pledges and agreements, official and unofficial, some mutually contradictory, made by the Allies during the war. In the end, South-eastern Arabia was left to itself; and the settled lands of the Mediterranean littoral and the Mesopotamian plains were shared between France and Great Britain as Mandatories. It is noteworthy, however, that this cutting of a tangled skein involved disregarding a provision of Article 22 of the Covenant. Speaking of the Arab peoples, that Article says, 'The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.' Whether these wishes were fulfilled is dubious, more dubious still if the peoples had any clear wishes; in point of fact, they were not consulted.

The Drafting of the Mandates.

Their rulers chosen, the next step was to draw up the constitutions of the mandates. An Allied committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Milner, was entrusted with this task. Here the Council of the League came in. At the end of 1920, the Council appointed a Mandates Commission; and addressed a letter to the Allies saying that it was ready to examine the texts of the mandates to see if they were in accord with Article 22.

At this point, however, the United States intervened. They had taken no part in the allocation, save to refuse to accept a mandate for Armenia. But they claimed that as

an Associate Power they had a right to be satisfied as to the tenor of the mandate texts. At that time the States held no direct communication with the League, so that all correspondence had to be done between the Foreign Offices, a slow procedure. The texts of the A and B mandates were published and submitted to the American State Department before being laid before the League. In the case of the C mandates, which were approved by the League Council in December, 1920, before the United States were informed of them, the result was unfortunate. A dispute at once broke out over the rights of America in Yap, an island in the Japanese Pacific Mandate, and an important cable junction. The controversy raged for a year, and was only allayed at last in February, 1922, by a separate Treaty between Japan and the States, safeguarding American access to the cables.

The League Council was not concerned in any way with the method of government except as a means whereby certain minimum requirements for native welfare could be secured. The mandate texts are pledges to fulfil these requirements. The Council therefore had little to do but to approve them. Two matters are perhaps worthy of note. In the Palestinian mandate text, a clause providing for the protection of the Holy Places was not approved by the Council; and the exact procedure for ensuring their security has not yet been defined. Again the actual word 'Mandate' is not used of the text under which Great Britain shares in the administration of Iraq; it became unpopular in the country and for the form of a mandate was substituted a Treaty, which was submitted to the Council for approval. The responsibility of Great Britain remains that of a mandatory Power.

Difficulties between the Allies delayed the formal entry into force of certain mandates for some time after the Council had approved them. It must not be supposed, however, that in the interval they were subject to anarchy or arbitrary rule. In 1921 Great Britain engaged, pending the approval of the mandates, to govern in the spirit of Article 22, and the other Mandatories followed her example. Thus there was little break in continuity between the interim period and the inception of the new system.

The following list shows the dates of allocation and approval of the mandates, and of their entry into force.

MANDATES.	ALLOCATION.	APPROVAL.	ENTRY INTO FORCE
C	May 1919	Dec. 1920	Dec. 1920
B	May – Oct. 1919	July 1922	July 1922
Palestine and Syria	April 1920	July 1922	Sept. 1923
Iraq	April 1920	Sept. 1924	Sept. 1924

Termination of the Mandates.

Termination is envisaged in the agreements regarding Iraq, Syria and Palestine. The British Government is pledged not to modify the terms of the Iraq Treaty of Alliance without the consent of the League Council, and to use its good offices, as soon as possible, to secure the entry of Iraq to the League as an independent State. 'In the event of Iraq being admitted to the League of Nations the obligations hereby assumed by His Britannic Majesty's Government shall terminate' (Agreement of British Government and Council, 1924).

The mandates for Syria and Palestine contain the words 'On the termination of the Mandate' (Article 19) without specifying how it is to be achieved, except in so far as a preceding clause stipulates for the consent of the Council for modification of the terms of the mandate, which include the frontiers.

The only clause in the African and Pacific mandates with any bearing on termination, is this same engagement that the consent of the Council of the League is needed for modification.

However, the Permanent Mandates Commission has extended the spirit of the Iraq text as a sort of gloss upon the others. In a discussion regarding South-west Africa in June, 1925, the Commission pointed out that the only means recognized for termination of a mandate was the self-governing status of the country, and that the independence envisaged was native self-government. This debate cannot be taken as a legal ruling, but it is an important indication.

Transfer of Mandates.

Transfer has already occurred between the original Mandatories. There have been rectifications of frontier between contiguous areas administered by Great Britain and Belgium, and Great Britain and France. This has been done by direct negotiation between the Mandatories, with Council assent.

Transfer to another State not at present a Mandatory is another story. It has not been suggested so far. But whereas the Principal Allied Powers recognized the original Mandatories as suitable States to fulfil the obligations of Article 22 of the Covenant, and thus have not

interfered in the transfer of land between them, it is conceivable that they might object to a new Mandatory being appointed. In any case it is certain that the consent of the Principal Allies and the United States would be necessary to such an arrangement, as well as that of the Council.

General Rules.

THE mandatory texts are based upon Article 22. In all of them the Mandatory States make certain engagements; those in the C mandates are simple, those in the A mandates are very complicated. One trait is common to them all; they all start from the position that the Mandatory Power has 'full powers of legislation and administration.' They then proceed to define various limitations to those full powers; and it is the limitations, mainly safeguards of native welfare, that are set under the supervision of the Council of the League. Other common rules are the prohibition of the Mandatory making a profit out of its rule, based upon the Allies' Reply to Germany on June 16, 1919, and the prohibition of causing natives to 'nationalize' as its subjects. In every case the Mandatory must make an annual report to the League. The text of a mandate cannot be altered without the approval of the Council, and disputes between States upon its interpretation must be referred for decision to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

C Mandates.

The power of the Mandatory States over the C mandates is nearly complete. They may govern them 'as an integral part of their own possessions' – that means, they may impose upon them their own laws and social systems. But there are things the ruling States must do, regardless of their own customs. They must, generally speaking, provide for 'the material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants.' They must prohibit the sale

of intoxicants to the natives, the slave trade, and forced labour except for public works and then for wages. They must control the traffic in arms and munitions according to the ruling international conventions. They must allow freedom of conscience. There are two things the rulers must not do. They must not train the natives as soldiers except for local defence and police purposes. They must not establish military or naval bases in the mandated areas.

B Mandates.

All these rules apply to the B mandates. There is one exception to the government as an 'integral part' of the Mandatory's possessions; the Tanganyika mandate has a clause instead saying that the Mandatory may include it in a fiscal union with its neighbouring territories. The clause forbidding recruitment of natives for use outside the area is modified in the French Togo and Cameroons texts by the words 'except in the case of a general war.' What is meant by 'a general war' is not clear; certainly France would argue that it was for her to decide. Again the total prohibition of the C mandates is modified to 'strict control' of the sale of spirituous liquors in the B – a concession to the fact that total prohibition in Africa at present is quite impracticable.

There are various additional provisions, all making further restrictions on the power of the ruling State. Not only the slave trade, but slavery is to be abolished. The native is to be protected against force and fraud in labour contracts and recruiting, and against usury. The native is not to alienate his land except under authorization from his governor, and native law and custom are to form the

basis of land tenure and transfer. These last provisions are of capital importance.

Further, the B mandates contain a clause – one which Japan and the United States vainly tried to get inserted in the C also – relating not to the natives but to the world of economics. It ensures what is often called 'the policy of the Open Door,' and runs: 'The Mandatory shall ensure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations, on the same footing as to his nationals, freedom of transit and navigation and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality.' Again, concessions are to be granted without distinction between nationals of States Members, and no concession in the nature of a general monopoly may be made, except a fiscal monopoly for the benefit of the mandated territory itself. Thus it will be impossible for a ruling Power to give (for instance) all the mining rights to a company of its own race and to deny them to others. Incidentally, the United States has ensured her equality with Members of the League in this respect by concluding separate Treaties concerning several of the mandates.

A Mandates.

Into a different constitutional class fall the A mandates, Palestine and Trans-Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, Iraq. They have in common certain clauses contained in other mandates, as, for instance, an expanded form of the 'economic equality' clause. But they are all much longer and more complicated than the B and C texts, and they differ widely among themselves. The most curious is the Palestine mandate. It represents an attempt to balance the interests of the native Arabs and those of the Jews, for whose 'national

home' provision was being made. The key to this document lies in Article 2: 'The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home . . . and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.' In order to achieve those various ends the Mandatory may develop the country, enact a nationality law, protect the interests of Palestinians abroad, and of foreigners in Palestine, secure the Holy Places and freedom of conscience, and regulate archæological research. It may raise voluntary troops for local defence, but may not make military, naval or air bases. The country may be taxed for the upkeep of forces of the Mandatory necessary for defence.

There are also Articles providing for the recognition of 'an appropriate Jewish agency' to advise the Administration regarding the 'national home,' and for safeguarding Jewish political status and economic opportunity.

The mandate for Syria and Lebanon is a single document. It is on the whole similar to the Palestine text with the Jewish clauses left out. There are differences, however; for instance, the Preamble does not entrust the Mandatory with 'administration' as in Palestine, but with 'the duty of rendering administrative advice and assistance.' Again, while the first Article provides for the framing of an 'organic law' for the territory, the second empowers the Mandatory to maintain its own troops there and to raise local militia. There is no phrase here 'on a voluntary basis,' nor any mention of military, naval or air bases. The

conclusion is that while the civil powers of France in Syria are less, the military powers are greater than those of Britain in Palestine. Or perhaps the differences express the angles from which the two Western Powers view colonial administration.

Remains Iraq, the Mesopotamia of the War. After long delays the relationship between Great Britain and Iraq was defined in a 'Treaty between His Britannic Majesty and His Majesty the King of Iraq.' This was signed on October 10, 1922, and was to last for twenty years, but a Protocol of April 30, 1923, provided that it should terminate 'upon Iraq becoming a Member of the League of Nations and in any case not later than four years from the ratification of peace with Turkey.' The Treaty is, however, to be renewable, an important provision, since there is no probability that Iraq will be ready for independence by 1928.

Under this Treaty, Great Britain promises to Iraq 'such advice and assistance as may be required . . . without prejudice to her national sovereignty.' Then the usual A mandate provisions follow, except that in every case the King of Iraq is to apply them, guided by the British High Commissioner. This guidance is particularly insisted upon in clauses regarding foreign and financial policy and military aid. There are also a series of subsidiary Agreements regulating conditions of service of British officials, justice, finance and the army.

On September 27, 1924, Great Britain sent a note to the League of Nations which was approved by the Council. It says that the Treaty of Alliance will fulfil the execution of mandatory conditions, and that Britain agrees to guarantee their fulfilment and to make an annual report to

the League. Thus it is clear that Great Britain is in fact, if not in name, Mandatory for Iraq.

In the Treaty itself one Article runs: –

'His Britannic Majesty undertakes to use his good offices to secure the admission of Iraq to Membership of the League of Nations as soon as possible.' This would mean, of course, the end of the mandate; for Members of the League must be fully independent States.

General Comparison.

Here lies the clue to the difference between the A mandates and the others; a difference plain on the surface, yet lacking a surface explanation. For it cannot be said fairly that a desert Arab of Trans-Jordan is a more civilized being than a tribesman of Ruanda, nor that Iraq has closer contact with the West than Togo. It may be argued that Orientals are more 'educable' politically than Africans at the present stage of their respective developments. But the difference is essentially an affair of time. The words of the Covenant Article 'until such time as they are able to stand alone' runs under the A mandate texts like the burden of a song. For all their complexity, these documents bear a temporary, almost a makeshift air. None the less makeshifts last long, sometimes; it remains to be seen how soon a building will rise to replace the scaffolding. It depends mainly on how long these lands remain likely to be crushed by invasion from without, or riven by dissension within. The Mandatories are there to keep the peace of the gates between East and West.

Simpler, solider, if less pretentious, are the B and C mandates. They are framed to fit conditions bound to endure as far as the political eye – always a little short-sighted –

can foresee. They deal with tropical lands, rich in products needed, or at least wanted, by the industrial countries. Therefore, even if they rule by local custom, white men must rule, to protect the natives from the greed of white men. It is the only hope of preventing the mandated territories from being drained dry.

Two comments remain still to be made. One is that these obligations do not, in themselves, constitute an advance in colonial government. They are no more than written pledges to apply standards already reached in the best-ruled territories of – for instance – the British Empire. It is even possible to compare a document such as the Agreement of 1899 under which Great Britain and Egypt jointly rule the Soudan, with a B mandate text, and find how nearly the two tally. Finally, within the framework of the mandates there is room for an immense variety in administrative system; their requirements, complied with, allow plenty of freedom for the exercise of each Mandatory's governmental genius.

Council and Mandatory.

THE supervision of the fulfilment of mandatory obligations rests with the Council of the League. But the Council, as was obvious even to the authors of the Covenant, is in itself an unsuitable body for the purpose. It consists of representatives of States, diplomats who can rarely know much about colonial administration. If they did, and used their knowledge to criticize the rule of a Mandatory, the following hair-raising situation might arise. Mr. A, Council Delegate for Ruritania, says to Mr. B, Delegate for Atlantis, 'Monsieur, I observe that in your Mandate Report the following trade items appear. Export: 5,460 slaves. Import: 10,000 rifles – er?' Mr. B replies, 'Monsieur, do I understand that Ruritania in your person accuses Atlantis of violating her treaty obligations? For if so, allow me, Monsieur, to remark that Atlantis (ever the friend of peace) will not submit tamely to such a slur upon her honour!' And there would Atlantis and Ruritania be, in public litigation before the League of Nations. To speak soberly, the inevitable consequence of charging the Council with criticizing the mandatory reports would be that, for political reasons, no criticisms would be made. Hence the Council, normally, merely receives a report from the Mandates Commission and approves it. Sometimes a disobliging phrase in the Report is interpreted by somewhat milder wording in the Resolution sent by the Council to the Mandatory Power, but as this is done after open debate the wording is but a veil upon a truth rather too bare.

Major questions requiring Council decision have been

raised chiefly in the form of applications to change frontiers, which are parts of the Mandate texts. The boundaries fixed during the original settlement aimed at following racial divisions; but in some cases the new borders cut across the lands of native tribes. In order to rectify such conditions, the Mandatories applied to modify the frontiers between Tanganyika and Ruanda-Urundi in 1922, and between British and French Cameroons in 1923. The governors on the spot are now, in 1926, negotiating a similar alteration between British and French Togo, and South Africa and Portugal are in treaty regarding the border between Angola and South-west Africa. Such changes, strictly in accord with the mandatory spirit, are naturally approved by the Council. The question of the Iraq frontier is not exactly a mandatory decision, for it was made the subject of appeal under the Treaty of Lausanne.

Mandates and the Assembly.

The League Assembly has no connection with mandates, except in so far as it has a right to discuss any subject mentioned in the Secretary-General's Report on the Council's work for the preceding year. Under this head, however, there is always a debate on mandates. The most dramatic of these was that of the 1922 Assembly, when M. Bellegarde, Delegate for Haiti, speaking in the name of the negro races, pleaded for clemency for the survivors of the Bondelswarts suppression.

These debates are a most powerful part of the League machinery. For the Governments of 56 States are there to listen to criticisms based on the Mandates Report, and the press of all countries reports them.

The Mandates Commission and the Mandatory.

It is to the Permanent Mandates Commission that the yearly Reports come for examination. Therefore the composition of this body is of extreme importance, and it is most ingeniously devised to be effective. The essential point is that its members may not be in the service of any government. This ensures, as far as is possible, that no political pressure can be brought to bear upon them. Add to this that the majority of the members must belong to non-mandatory countries, and that they are chosen as experts – some are ex-colonial administrators. They number ten; one must be a woman; and there is, in addition, a representative of the International Labour Office.

The present composition of the Committee is as follows:

NAME.	COUNTRY.
The Marquis Theodoli (Chairman)	Italy.
M. Van Rees (Vice-Chairman)	Holland.
M. Freire d'Andrade	Portugal.
M. Beau	France.
Madame Bugge-Wicksell	Sweden.
Sir Frederick Lugard	Britain.
M. Pierre Orts	Belgium.
M. Leopaldo Palacios	Spain.
M. William Rappard	Switzerland.
M. Yamanaka	Japan.
Mr. Grimshaw	I.L.O.

The work of the Commission is very remarkable. Its expertness cuts both ways, for its members are far too wise to expect miracles of good government, and equally, far too experienced not to know what can really be done by sound administration. Its impartiality can only be gauged

by a study of the minutes of its meetings. There the Commission examines the annual Reports, each in the presence and with the verbal aid of a representative of the Mandatory concerned. The dialogues which result are often instructive, and sometimes entertaining – as, for example, those in which Mr. Ormsby Gore, British Under-Secretary for the Colonies, undergoes a searching catechism from Sir Frederick Lugard, ex-Governor-General of Nigeria, with all the world for witness. At the same time the attitude of the members is sincerely friendly; they are much more anxious to help than to criticize. Indeed the Commission has gained so great a prestige that the Mandatories tend increasingly to send as representatives men who are administrative officials from the areas, and can therefore give information based on personal experience. In the sessions of 1924 the following local administrators attended the sessions, Mr. Hofmeyer, High Commissioner of South-west Africa, Sir Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner of Palestine, Mr. Newlands, Deputy Provincial Commissioner of the Gold Coast, and Mr. Tomlinson, Assistant Secretary for Native Affairs in Nigeria.

The members of the Mandates Commission specialize in different topics connected with their work. This enables them to subject the Reports to a reasoned study of great exactitude. Thus M. Van Rees has made the problem of land tenure his especial subject; Madame Bugge-Wicksell is the authority on education, Sir Frederick Lugard on the liquor-traffic, and so on. An enormous burden of work falls on all the members; and its quality may be judged by the fact that the two sessions of 1924 included forty-three meetings, no single one of which was spent in pointless talk. The report which the Commission

prepares and sends to the Council embodies much detailed, sober criticism and often constructive suggestion.

The Mandates Reports.

Here a short impression of the Mandates Reports may be of interest. They are written in answer to a questionnaire devised by the Mandates Commission, and designed to elicit information on the fulfilment of mandatory conditions. But they vary extremely; and much insight is wanted to interpret them; particularly, perhaps, a faculty for noting omissions. For some read as though their authors were aware that more might be expected of them than they were prepared to do; others, more innocent, as though secure in their good intentions they did not realize certain shortcomings.

In detail, the British Reports are short, inartistic, candid, convincing – and perhaps to readers of other races, a trifle surly in tone. This is because they are written by the men on the spot, who are always more intent on what they would like to do, and cannot, than on the routine of organized accomplishment. From a literary point of view, Sir Herbert Samuel's Report on Palestine for 1920–25 is a fine document, and the Cameroons' Reports are more thrilling than most novels of adventure. The Reports may be bought for small sums from the Stationery Office. The Australian and New Zealand Reports are full and good, the Australian Report on New Guinea for 1922 may be singled out. It has a number of excellent maps and illustrations and is vivid reading. The South African Reports, owing to circumstances, are rather defensively written. The Japanese Reports are short and elusive, suggesting main lines and omitting details after the manner of their

own colour-prints. The Belgian Reports are also fairly brief. The French documents are enormously long, exquisitely written, composed in the Ministry of Colonial Affairs at Paris, and almost impossible to obtain. For, though nominally public papers, all copies not sent to the Secretariat or the Mandates Commission are stored in the archives of the Quai d'Orsay, whence they can be excavated no more.

The Mandated Races and the League.

The mandated races have one point of direct contact with the League. This is the right of petition against infraction of the provisions of the mandate. But they may not write demands or grievances direct to the Council or Mandates Commission. They must send them through the Mandatory Administration, which is bound to forward them to the League. The reason given for this procedure is that the Mandatory is thus able to send, with the petition, its own commentary. More important is the underlying idea that machinery to implement a divided allegiance is good neither for government nor governed.

Some petitions have come before the Mandates Commission, but so far it has accepted and approved the administrative explanations. The flaws in the system are obvious. Most of the inhabitants of the mandated areas must be ignorant of their right of petition. Were they aware of it, they are mainly illiterate. If they can write, instances may be conceived where they would not dare to send a petition through their rulers, lest they incur powerful displeasure. Finally, the Mandates Commission has no means of arriving at the facts save by questioning the mandatory representative present at its sessions – nearly a

year, it may be, after the petition is sent – and cannot interview anyone to represent the petitioners.

Even the great skill of the Mandates Commission cannot make this into a working system. Yet, increasingly, as time goes on and the natives learn their rights, the possibility of petitions will act as a check upon any Mandatory likely to transgress its pledges.

'How many miles to Babylon?'
'Three score and ten.'
'Can I get there by candle light?'
'Yes, and back again.'

The Eastern Gates.

IT is a curious thing to recall how sealed and hidden Nearer Asia was a scant generation ago. Knowledge and intercourse had stripped mystery from New Zealand, on the other side of the round world. But Constantinople, so near to the modern factory towns, was like a gorgeous curtain over a locked door. Even the work of the East that reached the West, such as the cryptic stylized art of its lovely rugs, increased the sense of romance. If a handful of merchants, missionaries, and wandering scholars be excepted, Western Europeans knew little of these lands save for names half-remembered out of scripture and fairy tale. Baghdad seemed a city no less fabulous than Babylon.

All this because, as every child is taught, the fifteenth century Turkish conquests closed the trade-routes to the East, and sent merchants sailing, instead, round Africa and to the discovery of the Americas. But latterly these Eastern trade-routes have been opening again. The Suez Canal broke the barrier South of Arabia. The Baghdad Railway, before the War, was steadily boring through Anatolia and Cilicia. Since the Mandates were established, motor services run from Beirut to Baghdad, bringing the capital of Iraq within ten days of London. The chief of these is called the 'Nairn Route' after the Australian

brothers who organize it, and was opened in 1923. But if new things come in the East, old things stay. For centuries Turkey paid tribute to the tribes along the Pilgrim's Road to gain safety from molestation for the slow-moving caravans. Even so, Mr. Nairn is said to purchase safety for his Buick cars.

The result of these changes may be very great. From a world point of view, the Panama Canal must be considered also. This may mean that the great currents of trade instead of running North and South up and down the oceans as they have done for four centuries, will swing to the old lines East and West including, now, the Americas. The whole balance of commercial geography will be altered, if the Near East Routes have trade to carry.

The Country.

The Suez, in the meantime, by bearing the Far Eastern freights, has taken from Mesopotamia what little commerce was left her as the overland route from India. The problem of the rulers of Iraq is to revive the old prosperity of her trade. For trade and agriculture have made this land the nursery, as war has made it the grave, of many civilizations. It is full of the ruins of dead capitals, Ur of the Chaldees, Babylon, Asshur, Nimrud, Nineveh. They are set along what must always have been the merchants' way from the mountains of Kurdistan to the Persian Gulf, down the Euphrates and Tigris, a strip of watered plain between the Persian hills and the Syrian Desert. Now there are three main towns, Mosul in the North, Baghdad the capital midway, Basra in the Delta. The flat lands below Mosul have a feature even more desolate than ruined cities. These are the remains of great canal

systems by which the plain of alluvial silt used to be irrigated, and whose disrepair has turned wide stretches of soil into fruitless marsh. So that nowadays the narrow country is scantily peopled, half cultivated, half desert. The merchandise of the caravans which used to enrich Syria and the Adriatic comes through Iraq no more. We have forgotten that muslin is called after Mosul; the silks of China and the spices of the Isles are carried by sea; even carpet weaving is said to be decaying, debased by modern hurry, aniline dyes and the loss of the finest designs. Iraq has at present only one important export, dates grown in the palm gardens of the Delta, bordering the rivers for many miles above the port of Basra.

Future Wealth.

The country may become, however, a centre of the most modern commerce and industry. Fine cotton can be grown in the plains, under irrigation. A beginning has been made already. Mosul Vilayet (province) has been, and may be again, one of the world's granaries. Of greater political importance, there is probably oil in Mosul. Various schemes for working it have been arranged since 1914, only to be altered again. In March 1925 the Government of Iraq granted a concession for the whole country, under the 'economic equality' clause of the Treaty, to the Turkish Petroleum Company. This under British direction includes, British, French, Dutch and American interests, and is to last for seventy-five years. If there proves to be oil, the royalties to the Iraq Government will greatly help the finances of the country and may make possible the all-important irrigation works.

The economic revival depends on two conditions,

foreign capital and native labour. The capital necessary to establish peace has been provided by the British Government. If peace endures, the money for development will probably be found in the world's markets. Labour is another matter. Even were the people hard-working, Iraq has a climate whose heavy summer heat, the heat that made horror of the Mesopotamian campaigns, does not render work easy. Not all of the population, in any case, is industrious.

The People.

For what are the people of Iraq? Arabs in the main, of many tribes, under obedience to sheikhs. In the Basra area they are date-growers; in Mosul, where crops are rain-grown, cultivators of wheat and barley. But they vary very much in their manner of life. There are townsmen and merchants. Some tribes are peasants, some semi-nomad herdsmen, some wild Bedouin clans like the Shammar, camel breeders, camel lifters, levying toll on caravans and despoiling the farming folk whose toil they despise. For the hungry Arabian wilderness is for ever pressing the desert-dwellers out to its watered edges, at first to raid, then gradually to settle down.

The policy of the Turkish rulers was to play the tribes off one against the other, under the old idea 'Divide and rule.' A policy easy to consummate, seeing the septs are bred in ancient feuds, and apt to raise new rivalries. The task of the British advisers would be hard enough, if they had but to compose these conflicts and induce the restive sheikhs to live peacefully alongside of each other. But there is also a religious division among the Arabs, with an important political bearing. They are all Moslems, but in

the south and east they mainly profess the Shiah doctrine of the neighbour-country, Persia, and in the north and west they are Sunnis. In the old days the Turks gave offices only to their Sunni co-religionists, who thus, deprived of privilege, may incline to desire the return of the former régime. On the other hand the Shiah sacred cities, Najaf, Kerbala, Kadhimain and Samarra, are dominated by Persian religious leaders, the mujtahids. These towns have always resisted any civil authority, and have been centres of turbulence; from 1918 to 1920 of chronic intrigue and revolt. Latterly, however, particularly since the banishment to their native land of some of their Persian leaders, it appears that the Shiahs are growing disposed to co-operate with the Government.

Men of many races besides the Arabs live in Iraq. There are Persians in the Shiah sacred cities, Turcoman settlements, especially at Kirkuk, a famous and ancient Jewish community in Baghdad. The northern province of Mosul, above Mosul town, is mainly populated by Kurdish tribes. Marco Polo says of these: 'They are wicked men, and rob merchants,' an opinion shared by that acute Venetian observer of six hundred years ago with writers of to-day. About Mosul town live the Jacobite and Nestorian Christians, the remnants of what were once great and active Eastern Churches. The northern hills were inhabited till lately by Assyrian and Chaldean Christians. Here also in mountain valleys live the Yezidi, whose worship of Satan is one of the strangest religions of Asia.

The British Occupation.

The history of Iraq since the War has been a tangled

tale, for every district and every tribe is a separate problem. Beginning with the occupation of Basra in 1914, the British worked up the rivers. The first up-river offensive ended miserably in April, 1916, with the fall of Kut, but renewed efforts won the ground lost and the Baghdad area by 1918, and Mosul was occupied as a consequence of the Armistice. For the next two years, till October, 1920, the military occupation continued, although under it a system of civil government was developed wherever the country was quiet enough. The direct military rule, however, outlasted its time and the impatience of the people, for independence finally boiled over in a revolt, which was suppressed at great expense in 1920. At this point Sir Percy Cox arrived as High Commissioner and set up a provisional government of Iraq with a British adviser attached to each ministry.

King Faisal.

The question of a permanent ruler remained unsettled till July 1921. Then the Emir Faisal, son of King Hussein of the Hejaz, arrived in the country. The people were asked by referendum if they would accept him as king, and a great majority assented. On August 23, 1921, the Emir was formally proclaimed King.

Iraq Government.

Since that time the chief events have been the organization of civil government and the negotiation of external relations. The first is arranged on a basis of native rule with British advice. Behind the King and his Cabinet, stand a British High Commissioner and Departmental Advisers; behind the native local governors, British In-

spectors. But the British officials have no direct executive powers. They are the motive power, not the machine. Whether a system of Arab rulers is likely, for some time, to prove very efficient or entirely incorruptible is dubious. The present generation grew up under a bad tradition. But the British, before handing over, reduced the incredible chaos of the Turkish régime, particularly in taxation, land tenure and justice, to some sort of order. Thus the Iraqi start fair. And according to modern theory a nation learns the art of government better through the pains of experience than through submission to good but alien administration.

Meantime a constitution of the Western type has been set up. A Constituent Assembly was elected in March 1924 to ratify the Treaty between Great Britain and Iraq, and to pass the Organic Law provided for in the Treaty. The Treaty was passed by a narrow majority in June 1924. It was opposed by the Nationalists, who desired at that time the end of the British influence, and by some who felt that the engagement to repay Iraq's debts and to pay English advisers high salaries is too heavy a burden on the State. Finally, it was passed, together with a resolution trusting to the generosity of Great Britain and stipulating for her guardianship of Mosul.

The Organic Law sets up a Constitutional Monarchy, a Council of Ministers, an appointed Senate, a Chamber based on indirect election. In the Chamber minority representation is safeguarded. The King and Council of Ministers have executive powers not unduly limited by ministerial responsibility. The Chamber can force a resignation of the Council by a two-third majority. This law was signed by King Faisal on March 21, 1925.

The Army.

A Colonial Office Conference of March, 1921, held at Cairo, decided that the Imperial troops in Iraq should be replaced as soon as possible by native levies assisted by the Air Force. In the autumn of that year a rapid withdrawal of British troops occurred. The result of this to British taxpayers was that while in 1921–2 expenditure on Iraq and Palestine amounted to £26,500,000, in 1925 it had fallen to about £4,000,000 of which £2,000,000 would have to be spent on the Air Force wherever it was stationed. The Air Force took official control of British forces in Iraq from 1922. It has repeatedly proved to be a merciful and effective arm. It can produce submission by dropping bombs near, but not on, belligerents, and its aerial view defeats the guerilla strike-and-go-hide tactics of desert fighters. The native force are called the Iraq Levies; the best part of them is said to be the Assyrian Units.

Constructive Work.

The crying needs of Iraq are for medical services, transport, education, and irrigation. The medical and sanitary services were considerable, and very popular, in the earlier British occupation. After their manner the British invariably celebrated their taking of a town by cleaning its streets. Latterly – and it is a pity – the medical staff has been much reduced, on account of expense. Railways are being extended with a view to tapping productive areas, and carrying trade and pilgrim traffic. Education must wait on the training of competent native teachers, of whom the supply is still very short. Irrigation has enormous possibilities. The existing works, although enormously improved since the British came, are not yet well

under control. Any great scheme will have to be carried out as a concession granted to foreign enterprise.

Foreign Affairs.

The foreign relations of Iraq have been troublous and difficult, for it is surrounded with countries apt to manipulate internal discontent. The Shiahs of the Holy Cities intrigued with elements in Persia. Ibn Saud, the Wahabite Sultan of Nejd, has a personal feud with King Faisal's family, the Sherifian House of the Hejaz. Incipient trouble here was averted by a Treaty signed in 1922 and confirmed in 1925. There has been some friction with the French in Syria over gun-running and over the protection of the trade-route to Syria, where caravans were being ruthlessly harried by Bedouins, more lean and lawless than ever after the war-blockade. An agreement was come to, and co-operation of officials on the frontier is now said to be very good.

Much more important are the relations with Turkey on the North-west, which have given rise to the Mosul question. This touches the League of Nations and must be described in some detail.

THE MOSUL QUESTION

Mosul, being under the same administration, has been written of up to this point as though it were part of Iraq. Strategically and economically this is true. The mountains of Kurdistan make an angle with the Persian hills and the two ranges together form a natural rim to Iraq.

Mosul is contained in the elbow of the curve, and the power which holds Mosul town commands the Tigris Valley, for the hills in the south of the province are not an

effective barrier. Moreover the grain and fruit export of Mosul goes naturally down stream to feed Baghdad.

The geographical problem is simple, the ethnological one most difficult. The races of Mosul have been described already. Here it is necessary to add that North of Mosul town, itself mainly Arab, the vast majority of the population are Kurds. But they are not the only Kurds. Northwards, in Turkey, is a much larger block of Kurdish country, east in Persia yet another. The Kurdish race, therefore, since the British entered Mosul, has been split in three, and although like most dwellers in these parts the Kurds have much tribal and little racial feeling, the conditions for inter-tribal intrigue across frontiers are perfect, and not neglected. Besides they are unruly fighting folk; the Turks, fighters themselves, hold them down with difficulty. Whether the milder Arabs will be able to control even a limited number of them is a question.

Appeal to the League.

The frontier between Iraq and Turkey was left unsettled by the long debates leading to the Lausanne Treaty. But the League of Nations Council of February 1923 received a telegram from Lord Curzon saying that if the negotiations failed the boundary decision would be referred by Great Britain to the League. Eventually, Article III paragraph 2 of the Lausanne Treaty was drafted thus: 'The frontier between Turkey and Iraq shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months.

'In the event of no agreement being reached between the two governments within the time mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.

'The Turkish and British Governments reciprocally undertake that, pending the decision to be reached on the subject of the frontier, no military or other movement shall take place which might modify in any way the present state of the territories of which the final fate will depend upon that decision.'

Great Britain opened the nine months period by a note in October 1923. A conference was held at Constantinople from May 19 to June 5, 1924, but it broke down without any result. The nine months ran out on July 5, and despite the Turkish plea that the Treaty of Lausanne was not in force, Great Britain laid the Mosul frontier before the League Council of September 1924. Lord Parmoor represented Great Britain; Fethi Bey, Turkey.

The Council of September 1922.

Some discussion was needed to make clear to the disputants that the League Council was empowered to draw the boundary where it was thought just. On September 30, however, both parties agreed to a resolution of M. Branting, pledging them to accept the Council's decision in advance, and to respect the *status quo*.

The Brussels Line.

But, in the meantime, the Turks had thought it well to improve the *status quo* by creating a new frontier. Turkish forces poured into the north of Mosul Vilayet, occupying ground considerably south of the boundary existing at the time of the Lausanne Treaty. The British Government protested to Angora on October 9, and, as nothing happened, pressed for an emergency meeting of the League Council to define a provisional border-line. The Council

met on the 29th at Brussels under the presidency of M. Hymans. It resolved that the frontier should be that of the Lausanne Treaty date, laid it down in detail, and gave both sides till November 15 to withdraw their civil and military authorities accordingly. This decision was carried out, and the 'Brussels Line' was respected till September 1925.

The Assyrian Christians.

It must be noted that these events have entailed one grave disadvantage. The Assyrian Christians of the North left their homes in the War under threat of massacre, worked round by a great detour and fought for the Allies. They had settled in their own country since the Armistice. The Turkish incursion, however, drove them out again. The provisional frontier cuts them off from their hills, in sight of which, refugees a second time, they and their flocks are starving. The number of these unfortunates has been since increased by fugitives from deportations of September and October 1925.

The League Commission.

The Brussels Council appointed an impartial Commission of Three to go to Mosul and prepare a report to aid the decision. The Commissioners were M. af Wirsen, Swedish Minister in Roumania; M. Paul Teleki, former Prime Minister of Hungary; and Colonel Paulis, of the Belgian Army. They visited London, Constantinople, Angora, Baghdad, and went to Mosul itself in January 1925.

The Inquiry.

There they conducted an inquiry under conditions of

extreme difficulty. The country was trying, and travelling rough. The Kurdistan hills were snow-covered. The Commissioners separated, in order to cover the area thoroughly; the British High Commissioner in Iraq, Sir Henry Dobbs, protested against this method, but the Commission was free to choose its own procedure. The Turkish Government sent, as expert assessors, two men who had formerly escaped to Turkey to avoid punishment for sedition in Iraq. They were naturally unpopular. The Commissioners received individual opinions from leaders of every shade, hearing them in secret, without interpreters, the persons interviewed whispering but one word, 'Iraq' or 'Turkey.' But it is hard for the Oriental to believe in the impartiality of any Commission. Doubtless many suffrages were biased by distorted views of what the Commissioners might wish, or by hopes or fears of what the authorities might do if the voting leaked out.

The Report of the Commission.

The Report of the Commission is a fine piece of work, long, erudite and balanced. Its impartiality shows in the conclusions; they are presented seriatim, and do not all tend the same way, although cumulatively they are strongly on the side of union of Mosul with Iraq. The most important of them may be summed up as follows: The interests and feelings of the whole of the province are taken into consideration, because it is all contained between the two frontiers claimed by the disputants. The British demanded a boundary to include the hills of the Assyrian Christians, running somewhat to the north of the provisional Brussels Line. The Turks asked for a frontier drawn along the River Diala and the Jebel Hamrin, at

the extreme south of the vilayet. The Commission says that in legal technicality the area still belongs to Turkey until she has signed a treaty renouncing it. The people on the whole want to remain united with Iraq, but only if the mandate continues. Otherwise 'it is probable that the majority would have preferred to return to Turkey.' Geographically and strategically the British frontier is good, the Brussels Line equally good, both being ranges of the mountains that naturally end the plain. The Turkish Line is bad, except in the desert. Economically the country is one with Iraq. It is impossible to draw a just racial frontier. The final conclusions are that the Commission considers that important arguments, particularly of an economic and geographical nature, and the sentiments of the majority of the people, operate in favour of union with Iraq of the whole territory south of the Brussels Line, subject to the conditions that the territory should be under the League of Nations' mandate for about twenty-five years, and that in their region the Kurds should be ruled by Kurdish officials and judges, and allowed to use the Kurdish tongue.

Failing this solution, a compromise line was suggested, drawn along the Lesser Zab River, should the League Council decide to partition the province. In any case, a general amnesty should be granted, a League Commissioner should reside in the area to hear grievances, irreconcilables should be helped to emigrate, the Assyrian Christians should be re-established in their homes and rights, facilities for cross-frontier trade should be arranged.

Points of View.

It should be noted that the Commission ruled out the

Diala frontier, claimed by Turkey. Its report was particularly valuable as presenting the Mosul point of view. The people of the province, according to these impartial witnesses, chiefly wanted access to their markets. But failing the British mandate, they knew they would be conquered by the Turks, and in that case they would rather be handed over peacefully. From the League standpoint, the interests of the people must be paramount. There were, in fact, three other points of view, all less important. They were those of Iraq proper, of Great Britain and of Turkey. Iraq was well aware that if the Turks were on the Diala and British protection gone, no one in the plains would be able to sleep sound o' nights. Great Britain felt that the extra troops which would be needed to hold an indefensible and tempting frontier would entail greater expense and risk than the British people would be willing to bear. Turkey had made a symbol of Mosul; and it was hard for a Nationalist government to face surrendering a province, even one held only in legal theory.

The Council of September 1925.

All those views were voiced by the disputants at the League Council of September 1925. Mr. Amery, British Secretary of State for the Colonies, spoke for Britain and Iraq; Tewfik Rouschdi Bey, for Turkey; both drew ammunition from the Report. It seemed as though the case would be fairly simple, for Mr. Amery removed the conditional element from the conclusions of the Report by stating that Great Britain was willing to extend her mandate for Iraq until the time when the League Council should consider that the stability of the country was assured. He read a telegram from the Iraq Assembly

concurring in this pledge. But difficulties soon arose. A sub-committee, appointed by the Council to consider the case, reported that they were uncertain of the powers of the Council under the Treaty of Lausanne. Was the Council to arbitrate – to give a definite judgment? or only to mediate – to try to bring the disputants together? They proposed that the Permanent Court of International Justice should be asked for an opinion.

It is true that the words of Article III of the Treaty of Lausanne are vague, so vague that Lord Parmoor twice, in the Council of September 1924, asked for a judicial interpretation. But, as Mr. Amery pointed out, the legalistic difficulty was disposed of when M. Branting's resolution of September 30, 1924, was accepted. Mr. Amery also repeated that Great Britain was willing to abide by the League's decision, however given, but pleaded against a delay certain to cause difficulties in Mosul itself.

At this point, Rouschdi Bey played an ace which Turkey had kept up her sleeve for a year. This was a statement of Lord Curzon, in the discussions at the Conference of Lausanne. It runs: 'Article V of the Covenant provides that the decision of the Council, upon which the Turkish Government will be represented, will have to be unanimous, so that no decision can be arrived at without its consent.' Rouschdi Bey further said that Turkey refused to accept the finding of the Court – a legal finding on a political question – and that Turkey was only bound by acts her Assembly had ratified; that is, the Treaty of Lausanne, but not the agreement of Fethi Bey of 1924.

Thereupon, Mr. Amery said, ' I must make it quite clear that until the Turkish Government definitely and explicitly renews its pledge to accept in advance the

decision of the Council, then any pledge or assurance that the British Government has given falls to the ground and is not effective.'

The Council then referred the following questions to the Permanent Court:

(i) What is the character of the decision to be taken by the Council in virtue of Article III, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne?

(ii) If it be an arbitral award, a recommendation, or a simple mediation, must the decision be unanimous, or may it be taken by a majority?

(iii) May representatives of interested parties take part in the vote?

The Finding of the Court.

The Permanent Court, in November 1925, answered the questions thus:

(i) That the 'decision to be taken' by the Council of the League will be binding on the parties, and will constitute a definitive determination of the frontier between Turkey and Iraq.

(ii) That the 'decision to be taken' must be taken by a unanimous vote, the representatives of the parties taking part in the voting, but their votes not being counted in ascertaining whether there is unanimity.

The opinion of the Court was based on the intention of the Lausanne Treaty to provide for a settlement. The Court therefore pronounced for a definite decision, and for the procedure necessary to attain one.

The Laidoner Mission.

At this point it is necessary to hark back in time to

September 1925. The Government of Iraq then informed the Council that the Turks had violated the Brussels Line and were deporting the 'Goyan Christians.' These were tribes belonging to the Chaldean Church and living north-east of the provisional boundary within the area claimed by Britain. Mr. Amery asked the Council to send a neutral Commissioner to reside in the disputed country, in order to establish the facts regarding frontier incidents. The Turks refused to let a Commissioner go north of the Brussels Line. Nevertheless, the Council appointed General Laidoner, an Esthonian. He went immediately to Mosul, conducted an inquiry, and reported to the League Council in December.

These deportations were a puzzling move on the part of the Turks. It is imaginable, however, that they argued thus: 'In 1924 we sent troops, and gained ground at any rate to the Brussels Line. The League Council will do anything to avert a war, if it is scared into believing a war is imminent. Yet we had better not violate the frontier – much – for that would be flouting the Council. A small demonstration on the Line and a large show of violence north of it, and the Council will compromise or put off a decision.'

Whatever the motive, the Turkish actions proved to be a capital mistake. General Laidoner's arrival in October put an end to the visitations of villages south of the Line by Turkish troops. His Report of November 23, 1925, said that the Brussels Line 'is not a natural frontier, certain parts of it, indeed, are purely fictitious and can readily be crossed.' The violations therefore were 'ordinary frontier incidents, inevitable so long as the frontier question is not definitely settled.' But the Report on the

deportations was a damning indictment of Turkish administration. About 3,000 fugitives had managed to reach the British sphere, and isolated groups were still coming in daily at the date of the Report. It says, 'All the refugees' statements were in absolute agreement and may be summarized as follows:

'(1) Turkish soldiers, under the command of officers, occupied the villages, and in the first place obtained delivery of all the arms; they then imposed very heavy fines and demanded women; they then pillaged the houses and subjected the inhabitants to atrocious acts of violence, going as far as massacre.

'(2) The deportations were deportations *en masse*, and according to the statements made, the refugees were conducted to a district further removed from the provisional line. During the deportations several people fell ill on the way and were abandoned. Others died of starvation and cold, for, when leaving their homes, they had to abandon everything, and were unable to carry with them either food or clothing. During the inquiry several cases were discovered in which numbers of families who have taken refuge in Iraq are now in Turkish concentration camps.

'This is the general account given by the depositions. We have moreover seen ourselves that all those who have arrived are in an absolutely pitiable state.'

A supplementary report, written by General Laidoner's subordinates, gives detailed facts of such horror as to prove the studied moderation of the statements quoted above.

The Council Decision.

The League Council of December 1925 thus envisaged a somewhat altered problem. The Court advisory opinion

strengthened the technical position of the League, but the previous objection of the Turkish representative to the matter going to the Court weakened it. Mr. Amery promptly accepted the Court's finding on behalf of Great Britain. Munir Bey, for Turkey, declared that his country would accept conciliation but not settlement by the Council. However, it had for long been known that the real obstacle to the unanimity necessary for a Council decision was the view of a small minority. From September on, most of the non-disputant Council delegates were in favour of the British claim. The minority held that if possible a compromise should be devised to conciliate Turkey, and that to prove the willingness of the League to support a small State against a great one the people of the country must be sacrificed. So in December at first the case went slowly; it was feared that a unanimous decision would be unattainable. But General Laidoner's Report brought into sharp relief the fact that the dispute concerned the welfare of ordinary, helpless people. A wind of reality came blowing through the exhausted air of diplomatic negotiation. The minority were converted. On December 16, 1925, the Council pronounced its unanimous award.

The provisional Brussels Line was settled as the definite frontier between Turkey and Iraq, subject to minor rectifications to be arranged between Britain and Turkey. Great Britain within six months was to make a new Treaty with Iraq ensuring the continuation for twenty-five years of the mandatory régime, unless Iraq becomes a member of the League during that period. The British Government was invited to apply the measures recommended by the League Commission of Inquiry regarding Kurdish autonomy, pacification and commercial relations

with neighbouring states. As they would have been empty words, no suggestions were made to Turkey, not even about the Goyan Christians; who have thus bought with their blood and shame the possibility of good governance for others, but for themselves nothing.

The Disputants and the Future.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, as soon as the award was read, replaced Mr. Amery at the Council table in order to say that Great Britain most earnestly desired to live on terms of peace and amity with the Turkish Government and was anxious to treat with Turkey, to render the relations of the two countries easier and safer.

The Turkish Delegate refused to attend the Council session, but sent a letter saying that the sovereign rights of a State over its territory could not come to an end without its consent. Therefore Turkey's sovereign rights over Mosul remained intact.

It remains to add that the new Treaty with Iraq recommended by the League Council in 1925 has just (Feb. 1926) been signed and ratified by H.M. Government.

This chapter is, perhaps, already disproportionately long, so that the temptation to prophesy or to moralize must be resisted. A few evident points regarding this settlement may be emphasized. The Mosul Dispute was a most interesting 'League case.' If the League was slow over it, it must be remembered that a Peace Conference and direct negotiations had failed. Apparently quite intractable, it was subjected to all the expedients used by the League – Council debate, neutral inquiry on the spot, legal advice, a resident frontier Commissioner. The last was

a novel device. And in the end it yielded to a solution which on an all-round view represents rough justice. Moreover, from the disputants' point of view the League procedure is likely to prove invaluable; although in a sense it only consecrates the *status quo*. For the two inquiries proved Britain's case good in the eyes of the world. The weight of the Council decision should make it easier for the Government of Turkey to face its people with the inevitable. Again the value of the League method in such a settlement can perhaps be most vividly realized by a quotation from Lord Grey's 'Twenty-five Years.' Speaking of the settlement of the frontiers of Albania by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1912 he says 'we did not set much store by territorial merits in these details. Our efforts were concentrated on getting something to which both Austria and Russia would agree.' These conditions were changed indeed by the time of the Mosul Dispute. The interests of the country people were voiced in the Reports of the two League Commissions. The original Commission of Inquiry established the merits of the case. In a sense General Laidoner's Report made a still more important precedent. The facts about Turkish treatment of minorities were nothing new; they had been common knowledge for many years. But it was new for the Powers to be faced by a Report, written by their own envoy, which being public, could not be smothered, and being plain-spoken could not be blinked.

Yet, in sadness, a fifth view must be added to those of the League, the disputants, and the people of Mosul. 'What is changed? Sultan Abdul Hamid, or President Mustapha Kemal; Concert of Europe or League of Nations; when our turn comes it's all the same for us.

Dead babies born by dying women by the roadside; our girls enslaved; our men shot in the fields their sons will never till. *Nothing is changed*,' says the voice of the Goyan Christians. For if justice is beginning to replace expediency as the criterion of international settlements, political justice is still measured by bulk and not by quality. Iraq has gained the possibility of safe and prosperous development, but at a price which lays a heavy responsibility upon its rulers to use their power for the good of the people within their borders.

IRAQ
TO ILLUSTRATE
THE MOSUL DISPUTE
TURKEY
Assyrian Christians
Nineveh
MOSUL
SYRIA
Greater Zab R.
Lesser Zab R.
Kirkuk
Sulaymanieh
Diala
Samarra
SYRIAN
DESERT
BAGDAD
BABYLON
Kerbela
Najaf
KUT
R. TIGRIS
R. EUPHRATES
BASRA
PERSIAN
GULF
FRONTIER CLAIMED BY BRITAIN
" " " TURKEY
BRUSSELS LINE

'Tyre the crowning city, whose merchants are princes, whose traffickers are the honourable of the earth.'

Isaiah.

The Country.

SYRIA is under Mandate to France. Appropriately, it is shaped like 'Marianne's' Cap of Liberty, curved towards Turkey, with the crown on the East Mediterranean and the peak about Jeziret-ibn-Omar on the Tigris above Mosul. It is a broken country, especially towards the coast, where the mountain ranges of which the chief are the Lebanon and Anti-Lebanon run parallel to the sea. This makes communications difficult; for instance Beirut, the best port, lies up against slopes so steep that it is only served by a narrow-gauge cog-railway. Again the strategic line of greatest importance is not the coast, but the route Damascus-Homs-Hama-Aleppo which commands the lateral valleys and the desert. For once past the coastal hills, the interior is a great stretch of desert steppe, flat and monotonous. It is not sand, but soil, blossoming for a few weeks after the spring rains with a transitory verdure.

Despite these somewhat unpromising contours, Syria has been a prosperous land in different ages. Tyre and Sidon, the Hellenistic cities of Palmyra, Baalbec (Heliopolis), Antioch, the mediæval prosperity of Damascus, mark varying phases of a continuous history. The country may be shaped awkwardly for administration, though the hills are a great gain both for coolness and water in that hot climate. But it is magnificently placed. It is the junction

between the Mediterranean waterways and the overland routes to Asia, and it is the only watered road between Asia and Africa. Its people are traders born. It has always had skilled craftsmen, such as now weave the beautiful Lebanon silk. Besides, the hill valleys are fertile, growing grains and tobacco, the olive, and the mulberry, and capable of growing long-staple cotton under irrigation.

The People.

The people of the interior are mostly Arabs, of the Sunni branch of the Mohammedan faith. These divide into town-dwellers and settled agriculturists, and the nomad Bedouin of the desert. But the hill country shelters a surprising number of races and sects. They are, it seems, vestiges of the many invasions which have marked the rivalry of the Mesopotamian and Nilotic civilizations. For if Syria has been a market it has been, equally, a battleground. At any rate, these tribes have held their natural fortresses against all comers through the centuries. For instance, the Druses, of whom the chief group inhabit the hills called after them, the Jebel Druse, have had their hand against every man ever since they evolved their peculiar religion. The Lebanon is mainly people by Christian sects, Maronite, Greek Orthodox and many others, each with its own courts for matters of personal status, each inspired, by a hearty jealousy of all the others, to much political activity. The more northerly range, called Latakia, or the territory of the Alouites, is the home of various tribes of Moslem mountaineers.

There are twenty-nine religious confessions officially recognized in Syria. And to the people religion and communal loyalty are one and the same thing. This is puzzling

to the modern Western mind until we remember the familiar phenomenon of the Jews. They, who have preserved national life, not on a basis of race or language, but of a culture and religion, are nothing if not good Syrians.

France and Syria.

France has old connections with Syria. Before the war there were a number of French Catholic schools there. They are both the effect and the cause of a strong sentiment about the country in French Catholic circles. Her present position, however, may be said to date from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. This was an arrangement that if the Allies won the war that Turkey was to be dismembered between them. The share of France was to be Syria, Cilicia and Upper Mesopotamia including Mosul. The area envisaged has been altered from time to time, especially in 1919, when Mosul was allotted by the Allies to Iraq. But in the rough the agreement has subsisted, for it was under it that the French took over the occupation of Syria from the British in 1918.

After the Armistice, however, the situation became complicated. For during the War the British, working from Egypt, organized an anti-Turkish Arab movement. They used King Hussein of the Hejaz as a lever, and the Arabs grew to believe that in case of an Allied victory an independent Arabia would be set up. The Emir Faisal, son of King Hussein, raised an Arab force to harry the retreating Turkish Army. On the whole, the military effect of the movement was slight; the political result very important. For in 1918 the Arabs believed that the hour of their independence was come.

The First Phase.

By 1920 a compromise between pan-Arab aspirations and the French claim to Syria was reached. The French were to occupy and administer the coast zone and Cilicia, and the Emir Faisal was to rule the Damascus-Aleppo line and the interior, under French influence. But the ideas of the two authorities on what constituted French influence differed widely. In March, 1920, a 'Syrian Congress' held at Damascus proclaimed the Emir Faisal King of Syria. In April, 1920, the Conference of San Remo awarded the Mandate for the whole of Syria to France. The Government of Faisal saw in this decision a blow to Arab independence and instantly began to obstruct French administration, especially by denying the French the use of the inland railways. From this point strife became inevitable. In July General Gouraud sent an ultimatum to the Emir. It was not answered, and the French troops moved on Damascus, were met in a narrow gorge at Khan-Meiseloun by the Arab army and put it to flight. Damascus was taken, and the Emir Faisal left the country, subsequently to become King of an Arab Kingdom, after all, in Iraq.

The Evacuation of Cilicia.

While the French were dealing with the Arabs in the East, they were faced with difficulties in the North. In Anatolia the Turkish revival under Mustapha Kemal was stirring. The French held Cilicia by means of small garrisons in isolated towns. From January, 1920, the Turks picked the garrisons off one by one, beginning by wiping out the garrison of Marash on its retreat from that fort. The French were forced to treat with the Turks for an

armistice while they coped with the Emir Faisal, but by August, 1920, the struggle was renewed, with no decisive result, although the French forces were finally about 80,000 strong. At last, negotiations were formally undertaken, and the result was the Franklin Bouillon Agreement of October, 1921. This fixed the boundary between Turkey and Syria, afterwards confirmed in the Treaty of Lausanne. Cilicia and its Christian inhabitants, for whose safety no stipulations were made, returned to Turkey.

Schemes of Administration.

It is thus clear that the French in Syria have had a task even harder than that of the British in Iraq. They have been attacked from without and opposed within. The Latakia mountaineers only ceased resistance in 1922. Any attempt to rule as one area a country so divided by local particularisms was doomed to failure. The Mandatory has tried several schemes of regional administration, and perhaps the changes have augmented discontent, for local notables have been given hope of office and had it taken away again. The present system of federal government depends for its stability on the presence of a French High Commissioner in command of the forces called the Armée du Levant.

Syria is now divided thus:

The State of Great Lebanon – Capital, Beirut.

The State of Aleppo and Damascus – Capital, Damascus.

The Territory of Latakia – Capital, Latakia.

The Government of Jebel Druse – Capital, Sueida.

Each of the four States has a President aided by an

appointed Council, and an Advisory Assembly, part elected, part appointed. According to the Syrian correspondent of the authoritative 'Asie française,' the appointments have been made with a view to placing power in the hands of the pro-French natives. The President of Aleppo and Damascus is a Syrian, the President of Lebanon, to avoid tribal jealousies, a Frenchman. Latakia, until lately the scene of fighting, is under direct French rule. Up till October, 1925, the chief mandatory authority was the general in command of the forces. In November a civilian Commissioner was sent out for the first time in the person of M. H. de Jouvenel. The Syrian States employ various Frenchmen as advisers.

The French have abolished the Capitulations, in accordance with the Mandate. In order to safeguard the interests of foreigners they have introduced Frenchmen into the local courts; in cases involving a foreigner two out of three judges are French. Otherwise they have preserved the Turkish civil laws as a whole. The system was based on the French code, and should work reasonably well under able administration. A Committee is to be set up in France to draft an Organic Law for the area; for a Constitution is to be published within three years after September, 1923, when the mandates came into force.

The Jebel Druse War.

In July, 1925, the Jebel Druse War broke out. No official account of this conflict has yet been published – the French Government have presented a special report upon it to a session of the Mandates Commission summoned at Rome, February, 1926. Thus, though it cannot be omitted from any study of Syria, the facts given here

are based upon newspaper reports. In 1921 the French concluded a treaty with the Druses which was signed by Robert de Caix, constituting the Jebel Druse an independent State under French protection and with a French Adviser. After the death of the Druse governor, the French, instead of nominating a successor, appointed a Frenchman as acting governor. This was an unpopular step, although in 1923 the autonomy of the Jebel Druse was confirmed. More recently, a certain Captain Carbillet, who had served chiefly in Senegal, was appointed as acting governor. When he was absent on leave, the Druses sent a delegation to the Governor-General Sarrail, to ask for his removal. General Sarrail refused to receive them. Further incidents arose, and the temporary governor at Sueida arrested certain prominent Druses of the Atrash tribe. An attempt was also made to arrest their chief, Sultan Atrash Pasha. He, however, raised his people, seized Sueida, captured the acting governor, and besieged the garrison in the citadel. The first French relieving column of 200 men was wiped out, and the second of 400 was heavily defeated with the loss of all its material.

On August 25 further serious fighting took place between French and Druse forces to the north of Damascus, in which the French were obliged to fall back. At the same time the Druses, about 4,000 strong, made a raid on Damascus from the south-east and were driven off with some difficulty.

On September 3 the French Government announced the appointment of General Gamelin as General Officer commanding French troops in Syria. On September 14 General Gamelin arrived at Beirut, and on September 23 he relieved the garrison at Sueida which had been holding

out for two months. On October 6 the Druse leader, Hamad Bey Atrash, surrendered unconditionally to General Gamelin, and a week later it was reported that General Sarrail had appointed Colonel Andrea to be governor of the Jebel Druse in succession to Captain Carbillet.

Although the situation in the Druse hills seemed now to be fairly in hand, disorder had spread widely over the country. Anti-French elements in the population had formed brigand bands, and were harrying villages and small French posts. It seems that the French are in the difficulty of having forces of poor morale, and unreliability of the soldiers is the most upsetting thing any commander can face. Damascus was the chief focus of anxiety; it had always remained a centre of pan-Arab feeling, which showed in some harmless rioting at the time of Lord Balfour's visit in the spring of 1925.

Anti-French feeling was by October mounting very high in the town, and was greatly accentuated by the action of the French in parading through the streets the bodies of certain brigands whom they had killed. An attack on French soldiers in one of the quarters of Damascus took place on October 17, and next day several bands of brigands entered the town and started looting, with the result that a panic soon ensued, which communicated itself to the French. The latter sent a number of tanks through the city which did a considerable amount of damage in the bazaars, and next day after suddenly withdrawing all their troops, they opened a bombardment of the city which continued for 48 hours, and subjected it also to attack from aeroplanes. By this time a large part of the city was laid in ruins, and numerous lives had been

lost. That a general massacre of Europeans did not take place is largely due to the good offices of certain Moslem notables.

The news of these terrible occurrences gave rise to the liveliest anxiety in Paris and elsewhere, and one of the first acts of the freshly constituted Painlevé Government was to recall General Sarrail and to instruct General Duport to succeed him.

It will be the difficult task of M. de Jouvenel to restore order to a country where unruly elements are out of hand, and to make peace with the Druses, who are still up, seem to have plenty of rifles and who involve the whole country from sea-coast to desert in a state of war, which gives every brigand his opportunity.

It must not, however, be supposed that the position in Syria, once peace is re-established, is unpromising. Given good government and commercial prosperity, the mandate should be successful. Regarding prosperity, it must be remarked that a land of small producers and small merchants, set, as Syria is, like an inn at a cross-roads, is peculiarly hard hit if all four roads are barred. Yet this is the case in what used to be the Turkish Empire, formerly, with all its faults, a great area of free trade. Now it is split into five parts, each with a tariff system impeding commerce. The friendly relations of the British and French as Mandatories should help to make arrangements possible by which political division should do the minimum of economic harm. Under the present scheme the interchange of local produce between Syria and Palestine is free. Outside commerce, the great potential wealth of the country is tourist traffic. Crusader castles and Saracenic mosques, Aleppo with its wonderful Citadel, the

great pillars of Baalbec, Damascus, the most storied and beautiful of oasis-cities are bournes for the ordinary traveller. And through the country run the great roads of pilgrimage to Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem.

The problem of government in Syria is to reconcile violent local loyalties with general order. The French tend, wherever they rule, to regard order as the primary consideration. The tendency is based, no doubt, on experience of the passionate emotions which their own people put into politics, sometimes with disruptive results. Hence in Syria they will be likely to discourage agitation and make effective government their aim. 'Not what they want, but what is good for them,' said Cromwell; and the spirit of that remark is implied in the dictum of General Weygand, when, as High Commissioner, he said 'Good policy in Syria is to have no policy, and to govern well.'

NOTE. – At the session of the Mandates Commission at Rome, February 16–March 7, 1926, the French representative, while repudiating many of the allegations poured out against his Government's exercise of the Syrian Mandate, did not hesitate to admit that serious errors had been committed. Frequent changes in the High Commissionership, continuance of a military régime, linking the currency to the falling franc were grounds for unrest. And errors of judgment coupled with initial successes of the insurgents had caused its wide extension. The Mandates Commission on its part felt that Syria could not yet exercise complete and independent sovereignty. It would, therefore, be disastrous should any action of the Commission make impossible a task which was already difficult enough. A report was presented to the Council to this effect.

1. THE EASTERN GATES A. MANDATES

'I give you the end of a golden string,
Only wind it into a ball,
It will lead you in at Heaven's Gate set in Jerusalem's wall.'

BLAKE, *Jerusalem*

The Country.

PALESTINE is the smallest and most interesting of the three Asiatic Mandates. More, it is one of the most interesting countries in the world. Its history has been for centuries the lesson-book in which men of many races have first learned of the magnificent sorrow of humanity. Its very name has become a symbol, so that as when we hear a chime we think 'There is a call to church,' so when some one says 'Palestine' we think 'The Holy Land.'

It is a holy land of three great faiths. To the Jews, Jerusalem is Zion, remembered always in exile. To Christians Palestine is the country of Jesus. Moslems, too, revere it, for the Jewish saints, and especially Moses, are theirs also, and after Mecca and Medina their most sacred shrine is the Haram-es-Sherif at Jerusalem. For ages its roads have been worn by the feet of pilgrims come to see the land where men in profound and burning dreams conceived of the religion of one God. The greatest Empires that the world has seen have been the dominions of human belief subdued by the thought of dwellers in those stony hills and desert spaces.

Perhaps the country by its poverty favoured Semitic contemplation. It is certainly poor. The coastal plain is wider than that of Syria to the North, but much of it is waste and feverish marsh. The hill-country inland is really a southward-pointing finger of the Syrian fistful of hills.

It has a pleasant climate, but is only cultivable in pockets of earth among the boulders. The Jordan Valley, that strange fault said to be the end of the African Rift Valley, is tropically fertile. But it is below sea-level from the Lake of Galilee southwards. The Dead Sea Basin is sunk 1,200 feet, and is intolerably oppressive in summer. There seems to be no doubt that before the War Palestine was underpeopled, and that much land now barren is reclaimable. But it can never support a large nor a rich agricultural population.

Transport facilities are not bad. A motor service runs from Haifa to Beirut, and trains from Haifa to Jerusalem, and, since the War, from Jerusalem to Egypt. East of the Jordan is the Hejaz Railway, the line built for the Mecca Pilgrimage with the subscriptions of the faithful. The country lacks a good harbour; Jaffa and Haifa are open roadsteads where landing must be effected in small boats.

The Balfour Declaration and the Jewish National Home.

The British interest in Palestine, like the French in Syria, may be said to date from the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916. But the pledge which has created the peculiar position of the country was the Balfour Declaration of November, 1917. This runs: 'His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.'

It may be argued that Great Britain was not in a position

to dispose of the future of Palestine in 1917. Yet already the cracks were widening in the ramshackle structure of the Ottoman Empire. In any case General Allenby's campaigns of the next year cleared Palestine and Syria of the Turkish forces, and by the Armistice of October, 1918, fulfilment of the Balfour Declaration became possible.

Possible, not easy. Here was a little country, poor, war-devastated, with its old government swept away. If the British occupation had confined itself to reconstruction of Palestine as it was it would have had plenty to do. But the pledge to the Zionists introduced grave difficulties. Of the 700,000 inhabitants of 1920, about 560,000 were Moslem Arabs, 77,000 Christians, 76,000 Jews. A proportion of the Jewish element formed 'agricultural colonies' founded since 1850, partially subsidized from outside, and practising methods of cultivation much more modern than those of the Arabs. It was these communities which were the basis of the idea of a Jewish National Home.

The words 'National Home' are capable of various interpretations. The British Government has consistently held the view that they mean settlement in Palestine of Jews, with safeguards for their religion, in numbers which will not threaten the prospects of the Arabs. The Jew, vividly conscious of his nation, could say of no place 'This is my country.' 'In every land a guest, Of many lands a lord, In no land king is he.' – But now Jews will be able to feel that in Palestine they are citizens not as the subjects of any other race, but as Palestinians. There is, however, no question of Palestine becoming a Jewish State; only in proportion to their numbers the Jews are recognized as an element in its composition.

The Zionist Organization, as the 'appropriate Jewish

Agency' of the Mandate text, entrusted with consultative duties regarding purely Jewish affairs, holds the same opinion. It must be remembered, however, that Zionism is one of these great emotional movements which transcend ordinary rules. Jews from all over the world have subscribed money, some £40,000,000, to help in the settlement; and it is money which can never be repaid. Jews from all over the world, about 8,000 a year since 1920, have gone to Jerusalem not to grow rich, for that they never will, but to struggle with poverty, sickness, and a barren soil for the sake of living in a land which they can love as their own. It was inevitable that a number of these settlers, simple, as visionaries often are, conceived of the new régime as a Jewish Palestine. They may even have felt that the British victories were won in their name. At any rate some of the earlier immigrants seem to have behaved rather aggressively.

The Arab Point of View.

This attitude, together with the wording of the texts of the Palestine settlement, alarmed the Arabs. They have always declared that Palestine should be an Arab State, in which the Jews should be tolerated on similar terms to all other citizens. After all, they have been inhabitants of Palestine for far longer than Americans have lived in the United States. They say, too, that the Zionist scheme is a flat violation of the Allied pledges of Arab independence. There is some cause for their fear of the Jews. The weight of numbers is on the Arab side; in spite of the immigration they are enormously in the majority. But they are frightened at the modern methods and energy of the settlers, believing that sooner or later they will estab-

lish complete economic control over the country. Moreover, there is only a very small percentage of educated Arabs, consisting chiefly of educated sheikhs and what is sometimes called 'the effendi class,' so that strength for strength in a political conflict the sides may be called fairly matched.

Conflict.

It is a thousand pities that the position ever became a conflict, as it undoubtedly has. In 1920 and 1921 there were a series of riots, causing a considerable number of deaths. The worst of these occurred at Jaffa, with 300 casualties. The riots certainly represented a more or less organized attempt to get rid of the Jewish settlers by terrorism. When the British suppressed them and punished ringleaders, and also when it became clear that the Jews were ready to make reprisals, these manifestations ceased. But a body called the Arab Delegation visited England in July, 1921, to lay the Arab point of view before the British Government. They were heard, and assured that Arab rights were in no danger, but that the Government meant to abide by the Balfour Declaration. The Arab leaders, however, have steadily refused to co-operate with the Mandatory Administration. Till February, 1923, the British High Commissioner governed with the aid of an Advisory Council of ten officials and ten non-official members. Then it was proposed to set up a Legislative Council, consisting of the High Commissioner, ten officials and twelve elected members to represent the Moslem, Christian, and Jewish elements of the population. But the Arabs boycotted the elections, which had to be declared void. Subsequently the High Commissioner

suggested nominating Arab members for a new Advisory Council and, afterwards, the constitution of an Arab Organization similar to the Zionist Organization. The Arab leaders refused both offers. The Administration was forced to fall back on a purely official Advisory Council.

Palestine is thus subject to bureaucratic rule. Bureaucracy is a simple form of government enough, where its subjects do not interest themselves in politics. But Palestine is a very seething pot of political feeling. Consequently administration is difficult, for whatever is done can be twisted into a grievance by somebody.

The Administration.

In spite of this the Administration has done good work. In a very delicate position it has aimed at, and achieved, impartiality. It has reduced the country to order, quelling riots in the towns and banditry in the country. The forces there at present are a battalion of regular cavalry for which Great Britain pays, a police force recruited locally, and the Palestine Gendarmerie. The last is drawn from local sources and officered by Englishmen, and is very efficient. Besides, there is a force of 500 British Gendarmerie. The Administration has also reorganized taxation and expenditure, so that the country's finances are now sound. It has improved communications. It has also set up a system of law courts much simpler, quicker, and more effective than that of the Turkish régime. The courts of Islamic Law regarding personal status, together with the administration of the Wakfs, or Moslem religious endowments, are directed by the Supreme Moslem Council, composed entirely of Mohammedans. This also takes care of the Moslem shrines.

Perhaps the greatest services that can be done for any peasant Oriental country are the reform of land-tenure and the supply of medical aid. The Government has set itself to reorganize the land-system of Palestine, left in extraordinary confusion by the Turkish régime. It has granted certain lands formerly the property of the Turkish Sultan to their Arab tenants, and regulated the conditions of sale of land, already. But the different titles and systems in force at present are the cause of endless law-suits, and a simplification of these would be a great help to the people. As to the health services, there is no doubt of the good they do. The towns are far cleaner, sanitation is beginning. The inspection of drinking water and the slaughter of animals are brought up to a much higher level. The health department is concentrating largely on a campaign against the two scourges of the people, eye-disease and malaria. The Government is also extending education, especially for Moslem children. There is a fairly adequate supply of schools for Christians and Jews. But progress generally must be slow, for schemes for betterment depend largely on money to carry them out, and although taxation is heavy, great revenues cannot be raised from a poor country.

Here then is Palestine, the setting of a political problem of interest to all the world. The popular platitudes that nationalism was born in the War, or in the French Revolution, are of course nonsense. The sense of nationality is as old as tribal organization, as old as difference in colour, as old as the varied languages which express difference in the very shape of thought. But there is no doubt that the War emphasized nationalism. The Allied Powers, especially, taught it to their Eastern subjects and allies as an ideal to die for, and their opponents were not slow to

learn the lesson. To a large extent it has superseded that religious solidarity which for long has held the imagination of Orientals. The Arabs have a saying, 'No Nation in Islam,' but who to-day can feel that true, looking at a Chauvinist Turkey and the politics of Iraq, Syria and Palestine? Zionism too is a similar phenomenon; the driving force which is sending the world's merchants to poverty in a barren land, which has actually recreated Hebrew as a living language, is a passionate and mystic patriotism. But nationalism, as the Allies now must realize, is like the Djinn of the Bottle, a spirit easier to loose than to lay. It is a power so disruptive that elsewhere, as in Turkey and Greece, they are attempting to separate races by mass migration. In Palestine they have set two active nationalisms side by side, with the Mandatory Administration as a sort of umpire. It is a test case. Will the Arabs and the Jews go on conflicting, so that nothing can be done except a strained and difficult administration over their heads? Will they find the solution; some manner of keeping loyalty to race alive while working together for the common good? Every one must hope that this last will happen, that as Palestine gave the world religions in the past, so she may give it political illumination in the future.

NOTE ON TRANS-JORDAN

The country beyond Jordan formed part of the brief Syrian kingdom of the Emir Feisal. After his going, it was cut off from Syria by the frontier between the French and British mandated areas. Later, in 1920, the Emir Abdulla, another son of King Hussein of the Hedjaz, was recognized as ruler of Trans-Jordan, subject to the fulfilment of international obligations by Great Britain. The

Emir Abdulla rules with a small Council of Ministers, advised by a British official residing at Amman. Order is kept by an Arab Legion, with two English officers, and a squadron of aeroplanes of the Royal Air Force. The finances of the country, formerly very confused, are now being reorganized by the British representative.

There are three main problems regarding Trans-Jordan. One is order; the people are wild, and the Arab administration somewhat casual. The second is the Medina Railway, running East of the Jordan, and built for the Mecca Pilgrimage. It is the duty of Great Britain, as Mandatory, to keep it open and to secure its safety for the pilgrims. Lastly there are relations with Nejd. Ibn Saud, Sultan of the fighting Wahabite inhabitants of that country of the Arabian interior, is the enemy of the Hedjaz family. He waited till British support was withdrawn from the Hedjaz itself and then devoured King Hussein's kingdom; and he would be likely to do the same to Trans-Jordan if he dared. The opportunity lay in the fact that the Trans-Jordan frontier faded imperceptibly into the desert; there is no field for dragons' teeth to compare with an undetermined border. But the British Government, in pursuance of the treaty of 1922 between Iraq and Nejd, sent a delimitation Commission under Sir Gilbert Clayton. He succeeded in settling the frontiers between Nejd and both Iraq and Trans-Jordan by November, 1925; and it may be reasonably hoped that the danger of Wahabite raiding, such as occurred in 1922 and 1924, is over.

Trans-Jordan should be prosperous; it is fertile, and has a great trade in camel-breeding. But it will be some time before the people will be settled enough to profit by the possible wealth of the land.

SYRIA AND PALESTINE



'It's a mutual joint-stock world, in all meridians. We cannibals must help those Christians.'

HERMANN MELVILLE, Queequeg in *Moby Dick*.

IT is a far cry from Asia to Central Africa. The B Mandates differ from the A, in their history, their problems, their probable future, in everything indeed, save the accident that at present they are ruled by Western European States. On the other hand they resemble the C Mandates in the general character of their natural resources, and of the methods of government they require. Thus it is possible to indicate certain traits shared, with local modifications, by the B and C territories.

Products.

All these lands are tropical, save part of South-west Africa. They produce, or are capable of producing in varying parts, vegetable oils, cocoa, coffee, copra, rubber, cotton, sisal (hemp), cattle. Such a list needs no explanation. It is evident that great fortunes may be gained by merchants or manufacturers who can buy those things cheaply. There is already a heavy demand on the tropics for their produce, and it is bound to increase.

Yet it is rarely possible, in such hot climates, for white men to do field work, or even to rear their children. This means that the mandated areas are not generally suitable for colonization; they do not offer a permanent home to Europeans, only an opportunity to supervise the work of others. Thus the producers who are to supply the demand of Europe and America are the native peoples. Two

problems ensue: the first, are the natives able to do the work necessary to cultivate great surplus crops for export? the second, are they willing?

The Problem of Population.

As to ability, it must be constantly borne in mind that much of Africa is under-peopled, and that except in Egypt and some parts of West Africa and of the Union of South Africa, while there is no conclusive evidence whether the native population is increasing or decreasing, there is a wide-spread belief that it is actually shrinking. This is the case, too, in some of the Pacific Islands. It is a strange thing to consider the fewness and poverty of the people living in lands teeming with natural wealth. The circumstance has many causes, perhaps the chief being tribal wars, the slave-trade and slave wars, the partly consequent ignorance and superstition of the tribes, the devastating plagues of the tropics, and boredom.

War and the Slave Trade.

Of these factors, tribal wars have ceased with European rule. The main African slave-trade to the Americas and 'blackbirding' in the Pacific have gone, and the remainder is gradually being stamped out, the British in their Colonies setting the standard. Formerly the greatest, these now are minor causes of depopulation.

Ignorance.

The ignorance of the natives persists. There are historians who exalt custom into an ideal, believing that communities under its rule can come to no harm. And it is, of course, the great preservative of all societies. But the

African or Polynesian villager has framed his customs mainly to secure tribal land and religion against attack, and has not evolved many effective laws of hygiene. He lives often in dirt and squalor, subject to rules harmful to health. In especial the fallacy of 'old wives' wisdom' is shown in practices which help to make an infant death-rate varying, but everywhere appallingly heavy.

Disease.

As to illness, every one knows that there is a whole category of 'tropical diseases.' The mandated areas have sleeping-sickness, malaria, plague, leprosy, climatic skin diseases and many other ills as well as all those of northern countries. Some, such as influenza, have been imported by Europeans. And most natives have no ideas on the treatment of sickness save the remedies of the witch-doctor, so that in addition to the heavy toll on life, a great proportion of them are more or less unfit for full work. Moreover, insect pests, such as the tsetse fly, which carries cattle-fever and sleeping-sickness, desolate great areas in Africa.

Boredom.

Boredom sounds a frivolous cause to adduce for depopulation. But it is a very serious one. The old adventures of inter-tribal war and magical ritual are gone, or going, and with them the meaning of village life. Peace is a good gift of the white conquerors, and the suppression of the more malignant manifestations of sorcery a better. But natives of most races are dramatic, and intensely religious. Their whole lives are drenched in, pervaded by, a spiritual sense so vivid that to them streams and rocks, the movements of beasts, and the gestures of men, are

animated by supernatural powers. The seen world is transfigured by the unseen. This belief in the significance of things is falling from them, and except in mission schools no religious teaching is given to replace it. The people, always improvident and careless of the morrow, find life so dull that they are apt to grow daily more listless, till they cease even from the effort to win enough food from an over-lavish nature, or to fight the diseases that kill the children. This malady of the soul is 'accidia,' the Sloth which modern Europeans are so puzzled to find among the Seven Deadly Sins. But the Medievals, seeing it among them, recognized rightly that a low standard of living, without occupation or desire for any change to quicken the sluggish hours, rots men as fungus rots wood. In many places, unless their interest in life is revived, the natives will die out.

War Losses.

Two more causes of depopulation must be mentioned. One of these, the Great War, was local and non-recurrent. But East Africa suffered very heavy losses, especially among native porters, and the war was followed by famine and pestilence.

The Plantation System.

The last cause, plantation labour, may still be held non-proven. It is admitted everywhere that the absence of the able-bodied men of a tribe on a labour contract during months covering seedtime and harvest, and in some places for years together, means the disintegration of tribal life, hardship for those at home, and often demoralization of the labourers. But while some Administrations,

such as the rulers of New Guinea, are prepared to forbid continuous indenture from one area on the stated ground that it means depopulation, others have not yet made up their minds about it. A most interesting document on this subject is the Belgian Report of a Commission on the Labour Problem in the Congo, published in May, 1925. This report concludes that in order to preserve the population the number of men recruited for service at a distance from home must be definitely restricted. The limit of safety is set at 5 per cent. of the adult males.

The Transport Problem.

The transport problem interlocks with the population problem. It is useless for tropical peoples to grow crops if they cannot get them carried cheaply to their markets. Nowadays thousands of natives walk thousands of miles each year carrying loads to rail-road and port. In the tsetse-fly regions of Africa animals cannot be used for transport. This human porterage is wasteful, and unhealthy, and diverts many workers from agriculture. Roads, and railways, and ports deep enough for large ships, are absolutely necessary to native prosperity, yet the money to make them cannot be taxed out of a scanty and poverty-stricken population.

Willingness to produce. Land-tenure.

Prospective scarcity of labour, and actual lack of transport, hamper tropical production. Even were these difficulties overcome, there remains the question of whether the natives are willing to exploit their resources. The solution of giving the land to white planters who will use their skilled methods in supervising native labour has been

largely tried. It is too easy an answer to be entirely the right one. The natives hate losing their lands, which as a rule are the property not of individuals but of the tribe. To part with them is more than a personal misfortune; it is the loss of the whole tribe and its unborn generations; and in fact it is often forbidden by native custom. Already, however, in many parts, Europeans have acquired the most fertile and well-watered land, in the best climates, and the natives are left with inferior areas, sometimes even insufficient to support them. There results the condition described in the Report of the British East African Commission of April, 1925. 'There is probably no subject which agitates the native mind to-day more continuously than the question of their rights in land, both collectively as tribes and individually as owners or occupiers.'

Plantation Work.

Then, Africans and Islanders do not generally want to work hard on plantations. This is not unreasonable. Dwellers in cold climates are under the necessity to agitate themselves in order to keep warm, so that they have invented the comforting delusion that work is virtuous in itself and even pleasant. The inhabitant of the tropics is not so deceived. To him the sun is an enemy, and toil under its rays a torment. Thus he is apt to work as gently as he can, in return for a wage carefully calculated to allow him to earn his poll-tax and little or nothing for himself.

Alternative Labour Policies.

Various labour systems have been tried in the tropics. Latterly these have fallen into three main categories.

Those may be summarized, roughly, as the pro-white policy, the impartial policy, the pro-native policy.

Forced Labour.

The first, forced labour for private enterprises, may be said to be discredited. As it was practised in Togo, Cameroons and German South-west Africa, it was indistinguishable from wholesale slavery; and, together with 'punitive' wars necessary for its imposition, it was decimating the native peoples. Its inevitable result, at no long date, would have been that there would be no workers to till land or herd cattle. Thus even from the point of view of the purely self-interested European settler, it was a policy of economic insanity. Traces of this system still persist. In areas where plantation work is unpopular, the expedients are sometimes used of refusing the natives reserves large enough for them to live upon, arresting any unemployed outside the reserves and sending them to work out sentences for vagrancy on white farms, or alternatively, of imposing taxation so heavy that they must go out to earn it. Again, the system of 'prestation' or labour tax is liable to grave abuses. These methods are in effect next door to forced labour, for they are based upon the same cognate principles that the native exists to work for the white man, and that the native will only work under the goad.

The Impartial Policy.

There is a midway policy, based partly upon plantation labour and partly upon 'native production.' This recognizes that if the people are to acquire better methods of farming than the very primitive ones they pursue, they must learn from imitation of Europeans. It aims at allowing white men to buy land, where there is room, and to

employ native labour for reasonable wages, and with good conditions of housing, food, and medical aid. At the same time over-heavy recruiting will be forbidden, and the natives given ample reserves and helped to cultivate them. This is a difficult course to follow; it demands complete impartiality of the government of the country; and also a great deal of administrative work, because the natives have to be taught how to improve their cultivation, and helped to grade the crops and to market them. Tanganyika is an example of this method.

Native Production.

A third policy has been tried in British West Africa and the cotton lands of Uganda. This is to concentrate on native production with Government help. In West Africa Europeans may not buy tribal lands except in special circumstances, so that the native occupiers do not compete with white men, and grow their crops for their own benefit. British Togo and Cameroons, since the Mandates were established, fall under this régime except as regards ex-German plantations in Cameroons. The extraordinary rise in prosperity in British West Africa in the last twenty years proves that in that region natives can and will work for foreign markets. But lately it has been argued that still greater riches could be produced if Europeans were allowed to buy and capitalize land; and the present system of tenure has become the subject of controversy.

The Future.

The tropics, then, are undergoing an inevitable agricultural revolution. Nothing save a complete exclusion of all white commerce will prevent this; and that would mean

leaving the inhabitants in the backward state where the first explorers found them. Since civilized Western nations have assumed the responsibility of ruling them, this is an inconceivable policy. The very revenues needed to govern decently can only be drawn from the increased prosperity of the people. The work of the Governments must be, therefore, to regulate the strain of relations between races so differently developed. The danger is that the 'white' forces, by the very violence of their impact, will crush the structure of native life, reproducing with complications the social evils consequent on the Industrial Revolution in Europe. And the responsibility rests with the white man, for he realizes, far more than the negro, what the changes imply. For instance, when a 'boy' in South-west Africa brought diamonds to a German settler, he had no idea that in his hand he carried, with the glinting pebbles, the death of his race. But the mine-owners knew very well the effect of mining on native 'diggers.'

The greatest danger for everybody would be to create a landless peasantry in the tropics. Here men will surely remember the lessons of the French and Russian Revolutions, that those whose work is with the soil can never forget it; that sooner or later, when a leader comes and the day, when courage wakes, or the heart breaks, they will rise and take their lands again. And colour hatred would be added to the horrors always involved in a peasant revolt.

In these connections the Mandates will be extraordinarily interesting to watch. Between them, the 'colonial' nations will probably try every method of government; and the progress of the experiments will be recorded and

checked annually at Geneva. Moreover, the Mandates demand a minimum of good conditions. For example, on the face of it, it would be extremely hard to reconcile a 'horizontal' Colour-Bar law with the 'material and moral well-being and social progress of the inhabitants,' even in the C Mandates. The B regions are safeguarded to some degree regarding land-tenure, the onus of alienation falling on the Government. But the Mandate texts are scarcely more than a framework; and it is fortunate indeed that these countries have enlisted the services of missionaries, officials, and the best type of settlers, whose aims are becoming increasingly articulate and coherent. They have worked out some of the means by which, together, people and wealth may be saved. Of these the first of all is knowledge; study of the many different races, of their languages and habits and needs; for without knowledge the rulers cannot help them to adjust themselves to new conditions. Then there is reasonable settlement of the land problem, as the various countries demand, good conditions of labour, the encouragement of native production, the improvement of transport. More, there will have to be enormous effort expended on the cure and prevention of disease, and the care of the health of people and animals and plants. Apart from research and health services, this will have to be done by teaching the natives building and sanitation, and hygiene, and especially by training the women to take better care of the babies, to cook good food and to keep their houses and children clean.

Man does not live by bread alone, however, and even rich and healthy Africans and Islanders might still perish of ennui. Two cures for this disease are generally suggested. The first is responsibility, the second education.

The idea that the management of its own constitution is what keeps any society alive is increasingly favoured. Thus in all the B and C Mandates, the Administrations are delegating their authority to natives in a more or less degree. In Ruanda and Urundi the native rulers are scarcely more than advised by the mandatory officials; and even in the Japanese mandates the chiefs are called to consultation with their governors. Education covers, in a sense, all hope for the future. It includes training in agriculture and in hygiene, in craftsmanship – which Africans generally acquire very readily – and in book-learning. It must fill the gap left by the disappearance of old interests and most of all it must teach ethics, ideals and religion. This is a very difficult subject. France and Great Britain do not purport, in Government schools, to teach Christianity, an attitude reasonable enough in countries where a long Christian tradition ensures the respect for certain ideals, and offers, out-of-school, religious teaching on every hand. But in the tropics the missionaries cannot possibly train all the children. Nor can the Governments seriously envisage an education which will present civilization to the natives as a purely materialistic system, or even as founded on the bleak abstractions of lay morals. Neither of these can satisfy a vivid and emotional religious sense. They are bound by the Mandates to religious toleration; but they must be bound by their consciences to religious education too; and, somehow, they will have to get over the difficulty of the sectarian divisions within Christianity. They might decide to teach the form of religion of the strongest missionary body already established in any given area. In any case this is one of the most urgent problems before the Mandatories.

Liquor Control.

The A Mandates, Syria, Palestine and Iraq, do not fall within the scope of the Convention of St. Germain of September 10, 1919, which concerns Africa only. In those Asiatic territories, however, the large part of the inhabitants are Moslems, and as such drink no wine. Wine is made by some of the Jewish agriculturists in Palestine, but it is not likely to become a large trade. In fact, the problems of liquor control scarcely arise in these regions.

At the other end of the scale, in the C Mandates, Samoa, Nauru, New Guinea, the South Sea Islands, and South-west Africa, the following clause forms part of the Mandate text: 'The supply of intoxicating spirits and beverages to the natives shall be prohibited.' This provision has been faithfully carried out. In the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa there is total prohibition for white men and natives. There is a little smuggling, and some 'home brewing' by the natives. Both are kept within bounds by severe penalties.

The B Mandates in Central Africa present the most difficult problems. These fall under the régime of the Convention of St. Germain-en-Laye, which covers all of Africa save the Mediterranean lands, Egypt and the Union of South Africa. There are two aspects of liquor control in these countries. First the natives habitually brew alcohol for themselves, mainly beer and palm-wine, according to the region. These drinks are said to be made in dirty ways, even to be capable of carrying disease, and to be very harmful to health. Secondly there has been, and still is, a large import of what are called 'Trade Spirits'; cheap spirits, usually labelled as something they are not.

They are called in one British list 'Imitation whisky, imitation brandy, imitation rum, imitation gin.' Under the Convention their import and manufacture is to be prohibited; and better-class spirits are to be heavily taxed on a uniform basis.

Now it is obvious that it is impossible to prevent native brewing, especially in regions where there are almost no white men. Obvious, too, that the import of trade-spirits can only be checked by close preventive work at the customs of ports, maintained by all Governments. For if the customs officials of one African territory are efficient, and those of the next slack, the spirit dealers will run their goods into the slackly-guarded ports and smuggle across the land frontiers of the strict country. In Africa these frontiers are so enormous that they cannot possibly be guarded.

All signatory States publish an annual report on the working of the Convention. But the test case is liquor-control in the mandated areas. For under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Mandatory Powers have to report on liquor-control once a year to the Permanent Mandates Commission, where it is expertly discussed. Thus they are likely to make efforts in these countries, to avoid it coming out that they are failing. But the Mandatories take different points of view. The British areas tax imported spirits the 800 francs per hectolitre of pure alcohol provided for by the Convention of St. Germain, reckoning the franc at 25 to the £. The French reckon with the depreciated franc at 130 to the £. Thus the same liquor is cheaper in French than in British territories. The natural result is enormous smuggling from French into British Cameroons across land frontiers.

Again the French do not hold that light wines and beers are in the same class as strong drink; an abstemious wine-growing race, they think (and with much reason) that the native had better drink light wine than palm-alcohol. So they call these drinks 'boissons hygiéniques' and exempt them from the Convention duties.

Under the suggestion of the League Permanent Mandates Commission, the British and French Governments are negotiating directly to achieve an equalization of duties. With regard to the exemption of light wines, it may be regarded as an experiment that is worth trying. What is really important is the scotching of the traffic in dangerous alcohols.

This chapter is intended to act as a preface to some short sketches of B and C mandated areas. Only one of these, South-west Africa, is treated in any detail, and that because it presents some of the mandatory problems in a critical form, and because it has already attracted world-wide attention. The outstanding features of the others are stated in the briefest possible summary, based upon the annual reports of the Mandatory Powers. No attempt to achieve symmetry can be made; and here and there a trait is dwelt upon as throwing light on some characteristic policy or problem.

'There where the wild ghost-gods had wailed
'Twas a land transfigured, 'twas a new creation,
Oh, a singing wind swept the negro nation;
And on through the backwoods clearing flew:
"Mumbo-Jumbo is dead in the jungle,
Never again will he hoo-doo you,
Never again will he hoo-doo you.' "

VACHEL LINDSAY: *The Congo*, 'The hope of their religion.'

1. BRITISH TOGO

The Country.

BRITISH TOGO is a long narrow strip of land running North from the Gulf of Guinea on the East side of the Gold Coast. A range of hills slants through it, dividing it into two triangles, and about the bases of the mountains are the most fertile districts. There is some forest, including oil-palms in the South, but the land is mainly agricultural. The soil bears cocoa, cotton and other crops. The climate is tropical, with heavy summer rains and winter drought, so that for part of the year much of the country is swampy, and for part water has to be carried long distances to some villages.

Administration.

The population of rather under 200,000 is composed of many tribes, akin to their neighbours in the Gold Coast. The Germans adopted a system of 'direct rule' by officials, tending to decrease the authority of the native chiefs; but in any case it seems that this was not great. The British as Mandatories govern the country as though it were part

of their neighbouring territories, in two main divisions which fall under the general administration of the Gold Coast Colony and the Northern Territories respectively. This arrangement was advisable partly because of the shape of the area, partly because the revenues of Togo, drawn from customs, do not pay for its administration, and the deficit is borne by the Gold Coast budget. The British system of government inclines towards 'indirect rule'; that is, government by the native authorities aided and advised by British officials. It is held that this method is less disruptive of native life and more hopeful for the future than direct alien administration, even though it may entail a lower level of immediate efficiency. The weakness of the chiefs in Togo, however, make completely indirect rule impossible, and the system now in use is that Political Officers govern the seven districts.

There is a Court of the Senior Political Officer with jurisdiction over the whole sphere, and a Court of the District Political Officer in each district. In these courts the officers judge cases according to Gold Coast law and the 'principles of justice, equity and good conscience.' It may be imagined that in dealing with the emergencies of uncatalogued disputes and crimes, good conscience and good sense must often be the judge's guide. The native chiefs also have courts within their tribes. Each chief is aided by four elders and can judge cases up to a limited degree of seriousness. There is appeal to a Head Chief's Court, thence to the District Political Officer's Court. The British encourage the Chief's Oath, an invocation of a sacred word which sets the machinery of native law in motion.

Education.

Education is mainly in the hands of missionaries, and is being gradually improved. This is as good a place as another to make some observations which touch all the B and C Mandates. Missionary Education raises in a modern form some of the ancient puzzling problems of Church and State. Missions are always poor, always struggling with a task beyond their means. The various Governments usually acknowledge a debt to their civilizing influence by making them annual grants of money. In Togo, for instance, 9 per cent. of the annual revenues are spent on education, a large part being grants to mission schools. The grants are sometimes small enough; still they constitute a certain link between administration and mission. Sometimes the connection may be evident only in the periodic visit of a Government education inspector. But it must be remembered that the missionary schools, in countries such as Togo, undertake the whole education of their pupils. They must teach them other things besides religion – for instance, love of country and social conscience. Are the Governments entitled to ask, are the missionaries right in consenting, that children should be taught loyalty to their rulers, mandatory patriotism? It seems inevitable their minds cannot be left perfectly blank regarding their government. Missionaries, however, may become the instrument of political propaganda; on this ground German missionaries were banished from the B mandates from the Armistice till 1924, when they were allowed to return to the British spheres. The mind shrinks from the thought of teachers of Christ being involved with the things that are Cæsar's; yet obviously this is a question to which no easy answer is possible.

Christianity the Leveller.

Again, although this is not invariable, Christianity is apt to win the lower-placed of the natives. It is a religion deeming the slave as the equal of his master, the woman of the man. To women and slaves then, to the oppressed and the humble, it makes a great appeal. But what of the heads of families and chiefs of tribes, whose high place is confirmed by their share in the ritual of the old faiths? They are not likely to welcome a strange, levelling doctrine, especially when they see that the mission-educated youth has neither liking nor respect for tribal custom. Thus, in regions like West Africa, where the British rulers are anxious to conserve and work through native authority, and the spread of Christianity tends to destroy it, there is a certain divergence of aim. On the other hand, missionaries have a knowledge of native characters, languages and customs unequalled by any other class of Europeans. On many subjects, such as land-tenure, they have been the spokesmen of the native point of view.

General Conditions.

The health of the natives in Togo is good, on the whole, although, as in so much of Africa, venereal diseases are a heavy scourge. The natives in the South, together with many from French Togoland, migrate to the Gold Coast Colony for the cocoa-harvest, to earn the good wages paid there. Some from the North were indented for the Gold Coast mines, in the early years of the Mandate, where, it is said, conditions are bad, but recruiting for the mines has been stopped. There is no direct taxation.

The best hope of Togo is its administrative union with the Gold Coast, in whose prosperity and civilization the people will increasingly share.

2. FRENCH TOGO

The Country and People.

The greater part of German Togoland is now mandated to France. Like British Togo, it is roughly a thin oblong, set up upon the Bight of Benin, along the West side of French Dahomey. The only two railways, which run some way inland from the port of Lomé, are in the French sphere.

The 1923 Mandatory Report furnishes a great mass of information from which the following account is selected. The population, estimated at 758,000, consists of pagans, save for some 34,500 Christians and 20,000 Moslems. This is a dense population for Africa, in spite of an infantile mortality reckoned at 63 per cent. There are a great variety of tribes and of dialects, although Ewe is generally understood on the Coast and Haussa in the North. Hence the Government insists upon the exclusive use of French in the schools. 'How can we make the natives understand what we desire to do for them, what we ask of them, if they do not understand the tongue used by our agents?'

The land-tenure is usually communal, and commercial crops such as cocoa, coffee and cotton are grown collectively. There are no great European-owned plantations, nor any large industry. The place of the European is the middle-man's. The natives recruit willingly enough for short-term contracts, at 1 fr. 25 c. a day. Commercial clerks and chauffeurs are well paid. The natives are liable for four days' service a year on public works, such as road-making, but can commute their service for money. In 1923 more than half of them did so, and the Government had to hire 1,000 workmen for 'administrative labour.' It seems that they were astonished at being paid.

Religion.

There is an interesting disquisition on the nature of the native religions. It is summarized here as typical of the conditions African Mandatories have to deal with in religious affairs. It seems there is some worship of a Supreme Being, without temples or symbols; there are High Gods of nature, such as Thunder and the Sea; more intimate deities preside over human events like birth and death; and filling all life, as ether runs through the air, are good and evil spirits. These must be propitiated; more especially the evil, whose influence can be mobilized by an unlucky accident, or by the witchcraft of an ill-wisher. This accounts for the presence everywhere, for village and house, for clan and child, of fetishes and charms. 'This cult occupies an enormous place in the life of the natives, where everything proceeds from it, from the smallest actions, to family and social organization, and traditional customs.' And with the power of religion goes the power of the sorcerer, 'Voudounon' consulted on every occasion, the repository of tribal tradition, the priest often of savageries born of cruelty and fear in dark imaginations.

The suppression of fetishism is a difficult problem for European rulers throughout pagan Africa. It is impossible to suffer some of its excesses, such as human sacrifice, witch ordeals, and rites which produce a hysteria of terror. Yet when the sorcerer sees his empery of fear weakened he becomes a bitter enemy of the white man, and carries with him, often enough, the conservative elements of the people, the chiefs, also involved in ritual tradition, and the women, whose place in tribal life is too little acknowledged by white rulers. These feel that all their habits are condemned by the officials and despised by the young Euro-

pean-educated folk, and they lose all power except as a centre of racial hatred. Then, too late, the white man realizes that tribal discipline and morals are destroyed, and the people in an anarchy of decadence, for their old civilization is gone and no new one which they can grasp offered instead.

The only insurance against this danger is the patient study of local customs by officials who know the language of the people and can win their confidence, and who will be able to confirm the healthy part of tribal organization while pruning the dead wood of hurtful observances.

Slavery.

The 1923 French Report also contains a long analysis of the different forms of slavery. The French rulers declare that in one case, domestic slavery, the conditions are so mild that it is unnecessary to free the slaves, and that the other forms, such as pawning, are dying out.

Education.

Education is not extensive. The schools instituted by the Government are village schools to teach French and the elements of hygiene and agriculture, and some superior schools for the sons of notables and native officials, designed to raise up a ruling class. The single girls' school concentrates on housewifery. The principle is to avoid creating a literate class despising manual labour.

Health.

There are six doctors on the strength of the colonial troops and some native health officers. Sanitation, rats and mosquitoes are being coped with. Syphilis and drunk-

enness are cited as the greatest dangers to public health; an anti-syphilis campaign has been undertaken. Six doctors for 750,000 people in a bad climate seems too scant a provision.

Justice.

The French have set up a system of courts consisting of an appeal court at Lomé, 'circle courts' of a European Officer and two native notables to act as appeal courts in each district, and village tribunals presided over by the chief and two elders. These are not paid, a system popular with the people, but hated by the chiefs, thus deprived of their main source of revenue. The 1923 Report envisages regular salaries to the chiefs as compensation.

Native Share in Government.

The native share in administration is that Councils of Notables assess the poll-tax and represent 'collectivities' in dealings with the Government, and that two natives sit on each of the Permanent Councils such as the Administrative Council and the Committee of Health.

The people seem content, save for the inhabitants of one area who consider that the Germans tricked them out of their land, and, as it has not been returned to them, hate all Europeans. The French Report, in general, gives an impression of a carefully worked out scheme of which little, as yet, has been actually applied. But as there is a large surplus of revenue – two out of five millions of francs received in 1922 being unexpended – the Mandatory Administration has the means to increase its activities as the country is opened up.

3. BRITISH CAMEROONS

The Country and People.

British Cameroons, like British Togo, is a lean strip of land bordering on an older African sphere. It is not even a consecutive strip, for it is broken about half-way by the Yola province of Nigeria, which runs East and meets French Cameroons. It thus falls naturally into two main divisions, the Northern reaching Lake Chad, and the Southern the inmost curve of the Gulf of Guinea. But for reasons of race and geography the country is divided into four administrative areas. These are the Emirate of Dikwa in the North, two regions North and South of the Nigerian 'neck' governed from Yola, and the Cameroons Province in the South.

The Cameroons and Nigeria form part of the racial borderlands of Africa. Down from the Mediterranean shores, across from the Nile Valley, have pressed successive waves of people fair by comparison with the Central Africans – 'whitey-brown' in Sir Harry Johnstone's phrase. They have brought with them good gifts and evil; the social systems of their faith, Islam; the crafts of the Orient, which rendered through local hands and minds are fashionable now as 'Negro art.' War too, and slavery; the most organized slave-export trade was managed by dealers of Arab blood. Everywhere within their conquests there has been race mixture, producing strains where the Semitic and Hemitic traits, both physical and mental, are welded with the Bantu. On the whole, their contact with the negro races has probably been beneficent, mainly as imposing a monotheistic faith strong enough to free men's souls to some degree from the terrors of fetishism.

Dikwa.

The Emirate of Dikwa, in the North of the Cameroons, is typical of these conditions. It used to be part of the ancient Empire of Bornu, and is now reunited administratively with British Bornu. Of its population of 200,000 nearly half are pastoral Arabs; the main portion of the rest a people called 'Kanuri' of mixed race and Mohammedan religion, and there are also Fulani nomads and Hill Pagans. The race distribution follows geographical conformation. In the North of the country is a strange plain, called the 'Firki,' where Lake Chad used to extend, mud bogs in the wet season, splitting caked earth in the dry, and growing great crops of guinea-corn while it dries. This is mainly farmed by Kanuri; but there is a tendency for Arabs to settle and farm. The rest of the plains are less fertile. Running south in the West is an abrupt range of granite mountains where live the pagan tribes, driven to their fastnesses by invasion, shy, wild, little known. Not, however, entirely savage, for they have terraced the hills for cultivation, and practise rotation of crops – an uncommon art in Central Africa.

In the plains the system of land-tenure is Islamic. That is to say, feudal; all land is said to belong to the ruler of the State, but there are strong individual rights in farm-land. Until lately a class called 'fief-holders' lived in Dikwa town upon extortionate rents exacted from the peasantry. The British are encouraging the Sheikh to convert what the local official roundly calls 'parasites' to more laborious lives by confirming their tenants in possession, and causing the impoverished barons to act as district heads or farm their own land. This method of dealing with the idle rich is recommended to revolutionary attention.

The Germans hardly interfered with the native rule of Dikwa. The British, while maintaining the Sheikh and the Mohammedan system, have insisted on certain reforms. A Political Officer, under the Nigerian authorities, advises the Sheikh. Taxation is being regularized, the farming of taxes abolished, a Native Treasury is set up. A quarter of the taxes go to the Nigerian Government, three-quarters to the Sheikh's administration. This is used to pay officials, and is the way to secure justice; for unpaid chiefs must practise extortion; unpaid judges must take bribes, and so injustice is sure. Two courts administer Islamic and civil law. There is reason to believe that under British advice this area will become a prosperous and orderly State.

Yola.

The same general principle of indirect rule is applied in the rest of the Cameroons, but under very different conditions. The Fulani of the plains North and South of Yola are now ruled by its Emir. Their racial unity with Yola is shown by the fact that on the death of the Emir in 1924 his successor was a kinsman from the mandated area. But except for the Fulani, there is no civilized Mohammedan system to build upon. There are instead among the mountains a great number of pagan tribes, speaking a Babel of tongues, whose native institutions are hard to trace, for under the direct German rule they were suppressed. Here the British try to revive tribal customs and to establish a chain of responsibility. The village chief manages village affairs, and collects poll-tax which he passes on to the District Head, a superior chief ruling a clan or collection of villages. The District Head is guided by the advice of the British Political Officer, who tours his

region to see that the system works and to open relations with unexplored tribes. There are many such; the state of some parts of the country is typified by a quotation from the Report for 1922. 'The people living on the Atlantika hills have remained unsubjugated, the Fulani never having been able to make any impression on them. They do not venture from the hills, but live and farm entirely in them. Some of the Verri and Chamba living at the foot of the range occasionally visit them. When they do they say they are obliged to go up very warily and naked, as anyone wearing clothes would most likely be shot at sight, so great is the antipathy of these hill people to strangers. A few intrepid Hausa traders are believed to have ventured at different times to get into touch with the people, but have never been known to return.'

In these remote regions, however, the officials are gradually winning the friendship of the tribes; and where the administration is more effective, the District Heads seem to be very responsive to the charge placed upon them – even if the Political Officer still has to keep the cash-box of the Native Treasuries.

There are two very hopeful signs; the willingness of hill-tribes to come to markets in the plains, a thing they never did before, and a rapid decrease in slave-traffic, which still subsists in spite of the British abolition of slavery. For the native thinks himself a slave till he has paid his purchase money, whatever the law may say.

The Southern Plantations.

Land tenure in the non-Moslem parts of the Cameroons is communal. The clan owns the soil, the chief directs its

disposition, and the tribesmen have the usufruct for their life-times. According to Nigerian law alienating land to non-natives is forbidden, and leasing it has to be done through the authorities. This system is applied to the Cameroons, except for the Victoria Division. Here near the sea-coast the Germans had installed well-equipped cocoa plantations. The labour for the planters was conscribed by the Government from the interior; an unsuccessful arrangement, for mortality was very heavy, as many men were brought from entirely different climates. The British administration abolished forced labour, and voluntary labour has been ample. After the British occupation the plantations were run as a government department till November, 1924, when they were sold in London, no restriction as to the nationality of the buyers being imposed. It was suggested at the time that as some of these plantations are freehold, it would be more consistent with British West African policy not to sell them to Europeans, but to grant them to the natives in suitable lots. But the Administration believed that European supervision was necessary because of the existence of elaborate plant and machinery.

The Cameroons are as yet slightly and incompletely administered. Some things, such as medical staff, are very inadequate. But it must be remembered that Nigeria has had so far to pay for part of the cost of the mandated area, where the native poll-tax does not cover expenses. And despite the evident doubts of the Latin members of the Mandates Commission, the British are not to be moved from their policy of indirect rule, so successful in their own possessions. It means slow development, slow increase of prosperity; but it means that the natives do not have to

absorb more change than they can understand and that they can work out their own salvation.

4. FRENCH CAMEROONS

Country.

The French mandated area of the Cameroons is very much larger than its Western neighbour, the British sphere. It runs from Lake Chad to one degree North of the Equator, and from the Atlantic to French Equatorial Africa. Its main resource is forest produce. The Lake Chad area is plain country, but lower rises the North-western angle of the Central African Plateau, which has the mountains of British Cameroons for its edge. The plateau is highest towards the North, where a 4,000 foot range acts as a watershed, and the entry to the territory is up the rivers from the port of Duala and the coastal plain.

This is the course the French have followed in penetrating an area bigger than France itself. It was not till 1923 that they reached the Mohammedan region of the Northern plain, set up a post or two, and began to cope with the slave-traders of Mandara. This explains why the British, working from the more settled North of Nigeria, have had to play hide-and-seek with the slave-traders, who were 'in den' as soon as they reached the frontier. Now the two Mandatories are able to co-operate. The French, while penalizing slave-trade heavily, have not yet declared the liberation of domestic slaves, 'but the inhabitants know that they can obtain their liberty by presenting themselves at the nearest French station.'

Labour and Health.

The Administration exercises its right to requisition

labour for public works. Of the 5,000 men working on the railway in 1924, 3,800 were conscripts. After ten days' unpaid work they were paid ordinary wages. Criticisms of the wages, health, and conditions of the workers have been made from various sources, and brought to the notice of the French representative at the Mandates Commision Sessions of 1924 and 1925. In the North of the Territory sleeping-sickness is making inroads on the people.

Education.

The education of the natives is partly missionary, partly governmental. About 54,000 children attend school; of these some 4,000 selected as sons of chiefs and officials are at Government schools. The main object of the official education is to teach the children to 'think in French' on the grounds that the area owns no universal language but a number of different dialects, and that it is impossible to express the ideas of modern civilization in any of them. Otherwise the children are taught simple agriculture, handicrafts and hygiene.

French Colonial Theory.

This insistence upon French seems odd enough to the empirical British mind. It is even comic to imagine what a small negro boy in a steaming, equatorial forest makes of 'the ideas of modern civilization,' Parisian ideas expressed in the elegant, difficult, sophisticated language of France. Yet the conception is very significant. It is of the essence of French imperial policy. The French abroad, as at home, use a centralized system of bureaucratic government. But after working through various phases of theory as to their attitude towards their African subjects, they are at present in favour of what is called the 'policy of association.' This

means respecting local customs for the meantime, because it would be impossible to secure their immediate abandonment. But native chiefs are formed into 'Councils of Notables,' for purely advisory purposes, with no executive power, and selected natives are trained to act as local officials. That is to say a nucleus of natives are to learn, and subsequently to spread, French methods. The basic principle is the Europeanization of the African; the essential means, education. The French, of course, believe vividly both in their own form of civilization, and in the power of education to mould mind and character.

Thus the French as Mandatories offer their culture to the natives. They do not propose to develop local culture along its own lines. Their theory is revolutionary, and contrasts with the British evolutionary practice. At the same time their system reproduces in Africa that sense of the equality of men, of their natural value as persons, which most foreigners in France feel to be the most charming trait of its social life. Very few Frenchmen are snobs; their hierarchies are for business, not for personal use; they have almost no colour-feeling. So that natives trained by them do not, by all accounts, feel that they are merely becoming useful tools of their rulers; they feel that they are becoming as good as their rulers, equal sharers in the art of life of a supremely civilized race.

This end is a long way off in the Cameroons. As yet, it is represented by scattered 'postes' where the natives can come for medicines and by a certain amount of educational work. The French reports are, however, extremely interesting as clear statements of their ideas of government; of their intention to give Africa the best they know how to offer, France itself.

5. RUANDA-URUNDI

In the West-to-East order followed here, the Belgian mandated area falls to be dealt with before its huge neighbour, Tanganyika. Till lately, however, the two had a common history, for before the War they formed together the only German colony in East Africa.

War History.

The conquest of German East Africa was a very different affair from the walk-over the Allies had elsewhere. At first it seemed dubious whether the Germans would not conquer British East Africa instead. Later, their troops on the spot, supported by many of the natives, stoutly contested their gradual retreat southward from position to position before British and Belgian forces. One body under General von Lettow Vorbeck only surrendered after the Armistice. The British, however, established civil administration as they won ground. Its organizer, Sir Horace Byatt, later became Commissioner for Tanganyika.

Climate and Resources.

The Belgians were granted a Mandate in May, 1919, in consideration of their share in the fighting. In 1923, the British transferred a further section to them in order to follow the tribal boundaries. The two Native Sultanates under their administration lie North-east of Lake Tanganyika. Although the area is not great, it is a rich and healthy country of hilly grass-land, inhabited by pastoral tribes. The population is dense, estimated at over five millions. The part played by cattle in the lives of the natives is shown by the fact that until lately their stock was inalienable tribal property. Again, before the 1923

frontier rectification united all the kindred clans under Belgian rule, the chiefs on each side of the boundary used to have official cattle-thieves, charged with the duty of foraying. Altogether, the life in Ruanda-Urundi sounds reminiscent of the condition of Scotland North of the Highland Line two centuries ago. It is notable that there is no love lost between the natives of the two kingdoms.

The Belgians want to use this rich area as a source of supply of meat and hides for the forest-lands of the Congo, and have included it in a fiscal union with that territory. But the natural flow of export is Eastward towards Tanganyika and the Indian Ocean, and a large though diminished export of hides still goes through Dar-es-Salaam. The country is separated from the Congo by an unbroken 6,000 foot mountain-range, the further rim of the Rift Valley. In the absence of railways, therefore, the export of meat to the Congo is impossible; it would not carry the roundabout journey necessary. So the Government has followed a policy of encouraging native production of food-crops. It seems that this has been very successful, and that Ruanda-Urundi may in future feed the Congo towns.

Ruanda.

Ruanda, the country to the North, is a highly centralized kingdom where the power of the Mwami or Sultan is effective over most of the local chiefs. His Royal Tribunal is actually used as a court of appeal. It seems that even when some of the chiefs, before 1923, were under British rule, they continued to pay tribute to him. He is surrounded by a court of aristocrats and officials. There are advantages, for an incoming European administration, in

finding a strongly established native state. It can continue the work of government and requires mainly a degree of guidance along the lines of reform. On the other hand there are disadvantages too. An oligarchic régime is always conservative and resentful of changes menacing its wealth and dominance; and no king likes to see a second throne set on his daïs – even if it be behind his own. The Belgians have found both these things true in Ruanda. The Court was hard to win, and disliked the position of the Belgian Resident, who mainly advises the Sultan but has power to supersede his authority if necessary. But the reconstitution of the area in 1923 made a very favourable impression, and the court circle now co-operate with the Mandatory. Dissidence is confined to outlying clans where the King's law does not run. There the witch-doctors and chiefs are still apt to make trouble.

Urundi.

Urundi is in a somewhat different case. The king is only twelve years old, and was a mere baby when the Belgians occupied the country in 1917. He is under the guardianship of a Council of Regency, composed of native notables. This is no exception to the rule that councils of regency are weak concerns. It seems to spend most of its energy in dislike of the Mandatory, who, in the absence of effective native government, has been obliged to exercise fairly direct control. The Belgians are trying to counteract this hostility by means of a European tutor for the little King, and a school for the sons of the chiefs where they are given a training designed to fit them to rule their country in amity with the European residents. The sub-chiefs of Urundi pay little heed to the central government,

and there is no royal court of appeal from their justice. There are also valleys where the chiefs will not live because they are hot and unhealthy, and there disorder prevails. In 1922 there was a somewhat serious local rising, led by a pretender to the throne incited by a sorcerer. The Belgians suppressed the revolt, executed half a dozen ring-leaders, and restored order.

The system of the Belgians is based on a use of the native authorities whenever they are friendly or capable. The European residents take a very varying share in the administration of justice, according to local needs. They supervise markets entirely in Urundi and progressively in Ruanda. There seems to be no effort to organize European enterprises or to cause the people to leave their homes; and the rapid increase in agriculture has come about not by pressure but by the offer of good prices. On the whole the Mandatory Administration seems to be bending its effort to creating economic prosperity, and to be interfering with local, social arrangements no more than is necessary for the maintenance of order.

6. TANGANYIKA

The Country.

Tanganyika Territory is enormous. Its area is 365,000 square miles; one-third as great as that of British India. It includes every variety of tropical country; yet, next to size, the main impression gained by reading of this great stretch is of a desolation grilling in the sun. The coast-lands are low-lying, damp, hot, fever-stricken, though here is the capital Dar-es-Salaam. The great plateau inland has an average height of 4,000 feet; in the north are two great mountains, Kilimanjaro and Meru; in the south a range

called the Livingstone Mountains; but the rest keeps a fairly equal altitude. The upland is hot also, but drier than the coast, and more bearable for Europeans. In the west the country falls again to the Rift Valley and the Great Lakes. The population, very unevenly distributed, numbers rather above 4,000,000.

It is a cattle-country, and must be so for long. Great tribes like the Masai of the North live entirely by herding cattle. In their tribal rites milk has the symbolic place of the bread and wine of Northern peoples.

Tsetse-Fly.

The bush of the tropics however is the pitiless foe of the stock it feeds; for it shelters the breeding of the tsetse-fly, which infects man and beast with sleeping-sickness and cattle fever. This fly can best be destroyed by fire, and fire at high summer, after the spring rains are over and the bush is thoroughly dry. Then it burns completely, and the new growth of the next season is clear of infection. It is, however, a very difficult business to organize native co-operation in this work; in one district when it was systematically tried in 1923 it was successful, but it needs greater resources than the Administration can dispose of to carry it out on the necessary scale. The result of the tsetse-fly pest is exemplified in a quotation from the Report of the East Africa Commission: 'Travelling by the Central Tanganyika Railway, we passed through well-populated and productive areas from the coast to Dodoma. A few miles beyond Dodoma an extraordinary change is noticeable. Although the physical features and the climatic conditions appear to be similar in all respects, there are no signs either of cultivation or of cattle, or of population,

except for a few railway workers. The fly is responsible.' And half of the whole area of Tanganyika is under this malign dominion.

The League Inquiry on Sleeping-Sickness.

A notable attempt to deal with sleeping-sickness is being made through the League of Nations Health Organization. A conference of nations owning African territories affected by the scourge was held in London in May, 1925, and adopted a scheme suggested by the British Government, that an international commission of experts should conduct, in Africa, an inquiry into means of controlling and curing it. It is to work from the laboratory of Entebbe in Uganda, and report at the end of 1926. This will involve surveying the tsetse-fly area, experiments in destruction, and if a method of control is determined, co-operative action on the part of the Administrations over all the area. This is manifest good sense, for it is of no use to clean one territory if the next-door one remains infected; the plague will only spread again. But it will mean, as well as a great deal of work, much inter-governmental give-and-take, and it is in this connection that the League machinery is likely to prove invaluable.

Wild Beasts.

Another natural difficulty of the country is an overlarge number of predatory wild animals. Elephants, who seem to have had their usual herd migrations broken by the War, have developed a liking for the succulent greenstuff of the native plantations; and there has been a plague of man-eating lions who also acquired the taste for human flesh during the War. The natives are allowed muskets to

frighten off these and smaller robbers; it seems, however, they tend to use them to shoot antelope. A service of salaried game-wardens will have to be developed, for under the present system the European holders of rifle licences naturally kill old bull-elephants, carrying heavy tusks, rather than the raiding cows and calves whose ivory is less valuable.

Native Production.

The Administration is trying to encourage the natives to grow new crops, and to improve the cultivation of those they are used to. Given cheap transport, there is a very prosperous future for the agricultural tribes, though as yet the railways are entirely inadequate, and the tsetse renders animal transport impossible over large areas. The children in the village schools are taught to tend plants scientifically, and to grow trees too; for it is realized that the ruthless destruction of forests, if it is allowed to go on, will mean the death of the herds in the great heats for want of shade. Agricultural officers distribute good seed and demonstrate modern methods to the cultivators. The aim is both to improve the food crops for local use, and to stimulate the growing of crops for export. The main exports are steadily increasing and include sisal, cotton, hides, copra and coffee. Of these the natives produce sisal, cotton, hides and copra. The fine coffee is still a European crop grown by the planters in the Northern hills.

One interesting development is the adoption of ox-ploughs by the natives for communal cotton-growing in one area. The plough, in Africa, will be the great liberator of women, who, by old custom, do all the planting with hand-hoes. It is obviously impossible to found a great

agriculture on female labour, and yet it is hard for men to lay down their male vanity and take to women's work. But a plough is a fine new toy worthy of a man's attention; and this way will come time and energy for the women to improve their housewifery and nurse their babies properly.

The Amani Institute.

In this connection one distressing fact must be moted. The Germans set up in 1902 the Amani Institute of tropical agriculture, 'a tropical scientific institute superior to anything in the British Colonies and Protectorates,' with experimental plant and forest cultivation, a splendid laboratory and library. Owing to lack of funds, this Institute, which ought to be the central research station for all British East Africa, is practically derelict. One solitary Kew gardener with a tiny squad of native labourers, tries to keep it from crumbling to pieces, but can do little but fight the encroaching weeds. However, part of the projected Imperial Loan for East Africa is to be used to set Amani up again.

Here as elsewhere in Tanganyika is evidence of the serious constructive work Germany was putting into this one in particular among her colonies, work which meant large expenditure and was to have been the first instalment of general colonial reforms. She had, for instance, set aside native reserves – although it seems they were not large enough, and the Mandatory Administration has greatly increased them. She had passed a decree which meant the gradual abolition of slavery. The British abolished it outright in 1922.

Administration.

As far as the mandate text goes, the British administra-

tion fulfils its conditions. Alienation of land to non-natives in over-crowded districts is stopped, usury is forbidden, the distilling and sale of liquor is under strict control. At the same time there is much leeway to make up, for East Africa was a 'devastated area' in the War; for years there was a heavy deficit in the ordinary revenues, and there still is a loss on the railways. Great Britain cannot afford at present to spend as much on the country as Germany did before the War. So that education does not cover the native population in spite of many mission schools. The Government schools are good in quality, especially the technical schools. The African is a clever workman, and quickly becomes a skilled artisan. Again, there is too little provision for medical aid; there is a good medical laboratory at Dar-es-Salaam; but what hospitals there are, are crowded, and there are great stretches of country where there is no doctor at all. This is a tragic condition in a land ravaged by diseases which modern science can cure.

Native Administration.

In a territory so vast and varied it is impossible to adopt a uniform policy of native administration. The general aim is to employ the tribal organization, and in certain regions this is easy. The hereditary chief orders the affairs of his people, and the white official holds a supervisory position. But in other areas the German régime of centralization based upon the use of native police and 'messengers' had caused the chiefs to lose their prestige. Here indirect rule must be a slow development. On the coast a system of direct rule by 'Akidas' or native officials usually alien to the tribe they

govern, was so established that it can only gradually be replaced. As they prove their capacity the native chiefs are given judicial powers.

A steady increase of prosperity in normal times should provide means in the future to develop health work, education, transport and production, and to ensure improvement in the general welfare of the Tanganyika natives.

'Concerning the Materials of Seditions. It is a thing well to be considered, for the surest way to prevent seditions (if the times do bear it), is to take away the matter of them. The matter of seditions is of two kinds, much poverty and much discontentment.'

BACON, '*Of Seditions and Troubles.*'

Natural Conditions.

THE mandated area of South-west Africa is an empty and a dry land. A Census of 1922 numbered its European inhabitants as 19,500, its natives as 195,000 – about 215,000 in all, and its area is two and a half times that of Great Britain and Ireland.

The population is scanty, largely because the country is so dry. In climate maps it all comes under the category of 'constant drought.' The coastline is entirely rainless. Of the inland plateau the northern half, being tropical, should have a summer wet season. But its rainfall is meagre and uncertain, and that of the southern half is smaller still. The map has the creepy feature of rivers that appear and vanish, without flowing into lake and sea, sucked in again by the thirsty earth.

Indeed every question to do with the country seems to turn, more or less, upon the water supply. No crops can be grown, not even 'mealies,' for lack of rain. Certain reserves allocated to the natives cannot be used, because in the drought of 1922 they were entirely waterless, proving that in dry seasons they would be death-traps. The Commission appointed to determine the reserves 'incidentally

deprecated any encroachment on ground abutting on the Kunene River, in view of its future possibilities.' The hostility of the white farmers to the owning of stock by natives is partly due to the fact that their herds trample out the pasture round the water-holes. Much of the country must remain uninhabitable unless water is obtained by boring wells.

South-west Africa is bounded by Portuguese Angola on the North, the Atlantic on the West, Cape Colony on the South, and on the East by the Bechuanaland Protectorate. The frontier between Angola and the Mandate has never been properly delimited. There is a no-man's-land there, liable to become a haunt of outlaws, or an area of unscrupulous labour-recruiting. The South Africa and Portuguese Governments, partly in response to suggestions by the Mandates Commission, are negotiating a settlement at present. The Kalahari, the great desert of South Africa, lies in part within the area's Eastern boundaries. The coast, low, rainless and yet moist, has two ports, Walfisch Bay and Lüderitzbucht or Angra Pequena. Inland is the plateau characteristic of Africa, the great bulk of it three to five thousand feet high, with mountain masses rising to ten thousand running North and South. In these central hills lies Windhoek, the small stone-built capital, connected by railway with the ports and with South Africa. The great height of the country saves that half of it which lies North of the Tropic of Capricorn from more than sub-tropical heat. It is all veldt-land, and the two resources are grazing and minerals.

History.

Bartholomew Diaz, the first European to reach South

Africa, touched at Angra Pequena in 1486. Thereafter for four hundred years, except for a rare ship putting in to barter, its peoples were untroubled by white men. At length, in 1884, a merchant of Bremen named Lüderitz bought the coast from the Hottentots and hoisted the German flag. In 1890 Germany annexed the territory, saving Walfisch Bay retained under a special agreement by Great Britain. The colonists at first were mostly stock-farmers, till in 1908 diamonds were discovered near Lüderitzbucht. A 'rush' followed and the mines gave the country some industrial importance.

The War involved German South-west Africa, as it was then called, in a change of rule. Forces from the Union of South Africa invaded and took the country in 1914. Till the end of 1920 it was governed by martial law. In 1920 the passing of the South-west Africa Mandate Act settled its status as a 'C' Mandate, to be ruled by the Union of South Africa as an integral part of her own territory, subject to the provisions of the mandate and the supervisory control of the League.

The German Settlers and Constitutional Development.

Here already, in the change of sovereignty, lay a difficult problem for the new Governors of South-west Africa. In 1913 the European population numbered 14,800, of which 12,300 were Germans and the remainder Dutch South Africans. Of the whole number less than 1,500 were farmers. When the country passed to the rule of South-west Africa, after the War, certain classes were of necessity repatriated to Germany; soldiers, officials, police, those who wanted to leave, about 6,400 in all. At the same time there was considerable immigration from the Union,

and the 1922 census reports that of 19,432 Europeans 10,700 were South Africans, and only 7,900 Germans. It was, of course, out of the question to repatriate civilians who wished to remain in the country; world opinion, sufficiently doubtful of the detachment of her colonies from Germany, would never have suffered it. The German element therefore remains, and as the inhabitants of mandated areas are not counted 'nationals' of the Mandatory Power, and cannot be forced to naturalize, it might seem as though they would continue to be an alien and unassimilable body in the Union of South Africa. The difficulty was overcome by an expedient of General Smuts, who asked the leave of the League Council to follow an exceptional procedure, as the Mandate rules about naturalization were designed to apply to native races, not to other Europeans. He proposed to pass a Bill making German inhabitants of South-west Africa citizens of the Union, unless they objected, in which case by signing exemption papers individually they could retain their German nationality. The Council agreed in April, 1923. In January, 1924, General Smuts met a delegation of South-west Africa Germans in Cape Town. He invited the Germans to naturalize, assuring them of sympathetic treatment for churches and missions, state aid for a period for their schools, and exemption for thirty years from any demand upon them to bear arms against Germany. Also they were promised a share in the government of the country. This policy was so successful that in June, 1924, the Prime Minister of the Union was able to introduce a bill for the Constitution of South-west Africa, providing for an Assembly with a majority of members elected by white manhood suffrage. The German element will thus

be fully represented. The mandatory obligations for which South Africa is responsible are reserved to the Central Government under a series of heads of which the most important are native affairs and taxation, and land settlement.

It may be noted here that General Hertzog, the present Prime Minister, has on various occasions voiced the view that the certain future of South-west Africa is union with South Africa. The Mandates Commission in July, 1925, commented on this policy, and a slight breeze arose between the Commission and Mr. Smit, the South African representative. It was pointed out that the only road to union, involving termination of the mandate, lay through recognition of the country as a self-governing State, and that the League Council was far from likely to consider government by the local white minority as constituting self-government. In fact, it is unthinkable that the League should contemplate surrendering its tutelage in precisely the mandated area where it has been most useful, and is most needed, until the need is over.

The Native Question.

The constitutional solution reached in 1925 does not solve the political problem. For some time the German Colonists, being human, are bound to resent the new régime, and will ascribe any misfortunes which may befall them to alien rule. The focus of their discontent, as is evident from the Mandatory Reports, is the new system of regulating labour conditions. Now since the Reports variously remark 'the Native question is synonymous with the labour question' and 'the Native question and the land question are the same thing,' it becomes necessary

to describe in some detail this, by far the most serious problem confronting the Mandatory Government.

European colonization in South-west Africa has so far meant tragedy for the natives. Before the white men came, they were a number of tribes, pastoral and nomadic as was natural in that dry grass-country, owning herds, living on milk and meat, and moving from water-hole to water-hole as the surrounding pasture got trampled out. Some of the tribes such as the Herreros and Hottentots were rich and proud; none save the Bushmen seem to have been savages. A report of the administrator gives a translation of a fascinating document signed by the chief of the Hottentots in 1858, whose first clause runs:

'*Meeting of our Captains on the 9th January*, 1858, *on the Farm Habri.*'

'Article 1. We, the undersigned captains, have decided to bind ourselves by the following treaty, in the name of the Holy Trinity, the Father, the Son and the Holy Ghost. The Chief with his people will have the right when there is strife between him and another Chief who is Great, to defend himself, but he will be compelled to place their case which they have before impartial chiefs.'

Other articles provide that all the chiefs will band together against one resisting the arbitral award, that criminal jurisdiction is to be by impartial chiefs, and that a chief is to be liable to punishment if he offends against a tribesman. Clearly, a people which could conceive of compulsory arbitration as a substitute for war, even between the clans of one race, sixty years before the idea began to take root in the mind of Europe, cannot be held to have been incapable of managing its own affairs.

South-west Africa, of course, was no earthly paradise. The curses of Africa, witchcraft and slavery, were there, and are there still. Rich and conquering tribes like the Herreros held others, such as the Damaras, in subjection. As lately as 1921, when a new region, the Okavango River, was explored, half of the people were found to be slaves, who can only gain manumission by paying the price in cattle for which their ancestors were sold. Yet the lot of the natives, with the ills they had, was relatively happy before the Germans came.

The story of the German rule of South-west Africa is one of the blackest pages in the smudged history of European conquest of the African continent. It is over now, and would be best forgotten, save for two reasons. The German treatment of the natives is the only justification, but it is one amply sufficient, for the taking over of the rule of the country by another State. More important still, it is the depths to which the natives were brought down which explains their present far from satisfactory condition.

For the German colonists the natives were simply 'labour' – and hostile, reluctant labour at that. In that hot climate the white man must have natives to do manual work, whether in mines or on farms. At the same time the natives felt no need to hire themselves out to the Whites; their own herds supplied their wants. Moreover their tribal organization made for them a cadre for resistance to the white demands. With this resistance the colonists most effectively dealt; by forced labour both for men and women, by a systematic breaking up of the tribes, by expropriation of lands, by confiscation of cattle, by war – in 1904, in the Herrero War, something very like a war of

extermination. It is estimated that the Herreros were reduced from 80,000 to 15,000. Followed a peace-time régime including wide powers of discipline for police and employers in which flogging played the great part; and flogging of natives in Africa is often the same thing as the infliction of death by torture.

A couple of quotations from the Mandatory Report of 1922 exemplify the results of all this. 'Unbroken tribes exist only in Ovamboland and on the Okavango River. In other portions of the territory contact and conflict with the white man have brought about destruction of the tribal community and system, abandonment of old customs and loss of authority by the chiefs. Most of the Herrero tribe are now scattered over the Northern and Central occupied areas as farm servants. Their several wars with the German troops have broken them up into small sections owing allegiance to various relatives of the former chiefs. They are a proud and intelligent race, and at the time of the arrival of the Germans were powerful and wealthy, possessed of the best lands and enormous herds of stock. Their last war in 1908 left them landless paupers.'

Again, 'The Hottentots in the South were prosperous and possessed of large herds of stock before the invasion of the white man and the clash of interests. Their several wars with the Germans soon reduced them to a state of abject poverty.'

The *clou* of the German policy lay in the prohibition of cattle-owning by the natives. The natives lacking their sole means of livelihood had therefore to engage as labourers or to die of starvation. Wherein lay the difference between this system and the imposition of wholesale

slavery it is difficult to see. Moreover it bore a still more disastrous aspect. Poverty and labour, although disagreeable, are bearable. But the destruction of tribal custom, failing the substitution of other law, means the end of a race. All peoples, whatever their stage of civilization, live mainly by custom; it is the skeleton of every social body. The great conservative framework may, and indeed must, be altered continually, little by little, but to smash it wholly at one time, is fatal. At any rate, in South-west Africa it was proving fatal. Hardship suffered under cruel masters, hunger and thirst and worse diseases still introduced by the conquerors, losses in war, and most of all the greater loss of that tribal life which constitutes the interest of existence to simple people had by 1914 resulted in a stationary or declining native population. It is not only because of its climate that the country is so empty.

Finally, between the colonists and the natives were set hatred, suspicion, fear. The Whites, outnumbered, knew no means of keeping their hold on the resentful natives, except force. The natives crushed and desperate were without hope.

Without hope, but not without memory. Thirty years is not so long a time but that men and women, not yet old, may recall what came before it. Besides, the natives are mostly illiterate, and traditions handed down from mouth to mouth are proverbially vivid. It is no wonder that with the coming of the troops from Cape Colony, their country's southern neighbour where there is, in law, no colour bar, the natives remembered their past age of gold and turned to hope again. In the invasion they saw deliverance; even in distant England rumours were heard, in

1915, that with the entry of the South African forces the remnants of tribes starving in the Kalahari began to trek back to their old homes.

Until 1920 the country was under martial law, and apart from the allotment of government 'reserves' for habitation by natives the Administration could not make permanent arrangements for their welfare. After the formal annexation, however, there fell upon the Government of South Africa the full weight of responsibility for bettering the condition of its new people.

Much has been done since then. The labour regulations have been entirely revised and largely altered. Flogging by employers is forbidden. Women are not required to work in any case, nor men if they have 'sufficient means of subsistence' – ten large or fifty small stock. Outside the reserves those who have no such means and no job are liable to arrest for vagrancy. The prohibition of native stock owning is abolished. This reform, added to the end of forced labour, has made many natives independent again, especially as after the Peace, during the financial depression, farmers were apt to pay their labourers in stock. This it must be noted in passing, was an unsatisfactory method of payment, and the Administration did its best to stop it. Often, owing to the depreciation in the value of stock, it meant that labourers received much less than the worth of their work. Besides, the farmers as a whole were opposed to the payment of the natives in a way which set them above the obligation to work. However, the crux of the reforms lies in the land question. To let natives have cattle without letting them have grazing grounds obviously would be useless.

The Land Problem.

The Mandatory Report for 1922 says: 'During the war period nothing concerning permanent allocation of ground could be done, though even the comparatively few Government farms, which in the emergency were granted by our administration as temporary reserves, were much appreciated by natives entitled to such accommodation, and healthy, well-nourished children born during that period are now to be observed there, representing potential labourers of the future.' At the end of 1920 a Commission of six was appointed to arrange for native reserves, and made estimates for 2½ millions of acres. The difficulty, as usual, was water; all the best land had been taken by the Whites, and what remained was doubtfully habitable. Indeed the doubt was removed in 1922, when a terrific drought proved that, unless wells were bored, the lot of natives in some of the reserves indicated would be death by thirst in a dry season.

The most significant passage in the Mandatory Reports published hitherto is the following. 'The Natives, who of course had been the original owners of the land which had as a result of war been confiscated by the German Government, cut up into farms, and sold or allotted to Europeans, had formed the expectation that this Administration as the natural result of the war would similarly confiscate German-owned farms, and thus the natives would recover the lost land and homes previously occupied by them. Almost without exception each section asked for the allotment of the old tribal areas, in which vested rights had accrued, and the utmost difficulty was experienced in making them realize the utter impossibility of complying with such a request.'

The Clash of Interests.

Now what is the meaning of all this? The impression left by the Reports is of a complete opposition in the white and native points of view. In the time of the German régime the Whites used the natives ruthlessly as labour. The natives on the defeat of the Germans hoped for a return of their old liberty and prosperity. The position of the new Administration must arouse compassion in any just mind; the Administrator himself is as a man who must walk along a narrow glass-crowned wall between two abysses. On the one hand are the farmers, all clamouring for labour, the Germans among them unable to see the point of the new regulations, and dead against any measures by which the native may escape work. Behind the farmers stands almost the whole white population, small in numbers, scattered and frightened. Every Report records 'scares' of a native rising, which run through the white community at the dropping of a mere spark of rumour like fire through whins. On the other side are the natives, better off now than they were – sufficiently better off to be resentful. This is an inevitable stage on the road from servitude to freedom, but in this case they have just grounds for their resentment. Their hopes have not been fulfilled; their old liberty and their old lands are not restored, nor will they be restored. The 'possibilities' for the Whites of a river, the 'vested interests' of the Whites in lands, prevent it. The interests of the blacks, admittedly older in date, are not considered as vested.

There is no doubt, judging from accumulated remarks occuring in his Reports, that the Administrator sees the problem from the colonial angle. He sees also, and states fairly, part of the native view. Nevertheless, his attitude

throughout is indicated by that innocently revealing phrase 'healthy well-nourished children – representing potential labourers of the future.' To the Administration the natives are still 'labour.' It is awake, it is true, to the economic folly of the German system, and is disposed to take care that there shall be no future dearth of labour owing to the dying out of the natives. It is also fair to say that the cruder cruelties of the past régime are evidently repugnant to the new rulers. But although the Administrator comments with strong moral indignation 'as a general rule the natives are poor workers and stupid. The vast majority would prefer to be idle,' there is no sign anywhere of any understanding that these people might reasonably prefer living in their own way to toiling on white men's farms.

In fact the employers' attitude of about 1860 in England has been substituted for that of about 1820; enlightened self-interest for self-interest pure. Yet if the country must be industrialized it seems a pity to effect the revolution under the dictation of ideas so out-of-date.

These being the ideas, the objects of the Administration are thus stated:

(*a*) 'To secure the contentment and welfare of the natives as far as possible, and to establish certainty to the Whites as to the permanent places of abode of the natives.'

(*b*) 'To tighten up the Native Administration so as to prevent vagrancy and idleness.' But the accent has been laid on the second aim.

It was indeed in this connection that the deplorable affair known as the Bondelswart Rebellion of May, 1922, took place.

The Bondelswart Suppression.

The history of this massacre may be summed up as follows: The Bondel Hottentots were a poverty-stricken tribe living in a reserve in the southern part of the territory. They saw no advantage in working for local white farmers, who being ill off themselves could neither feed, clothe nor pay them. A law, passed according to the Administrator's statement, in order to force the natives to work, imposed a prohibitive tax on the hunting dogs upon whose quarry the Hottentots managed to live. They were already on the worst of terms with the local police, and open friction occurred when a native notable, one Abraham Morris, returned in good faith but without authorization from the Cape Colony, and was summoned to be arrested. The Hottentots refused to surrender Morris and apparently believing that the threats of the police meant that the white men intended to destroy them, went into laager on a rock-crowned hill at a place called Guruchas. By this time, the 'Native war' scare was running hard through the country; the white population was terrified. The local police and magistrates made some efforts to communicate with the Bondels, who declared they did not mean to fight, but refused to surrender Morris and the leaders unless amnesty were promised. Mr. Hofmeyer, the Administrator of the territory, arrived, collected volunteers from the Whites, and sent for aeroplanes from the nearest aerodrome. His forces surrounded the hill where the Bondels were encamped with their women and children. The hill was bombarded by aeroplanes from three o'clock till dark. In the night a part of the Hottentots who were completely demoralized by this, to them, new and appalling form of attack, escaped from the camp. They

were afterwards caught and completely defeated. The surviving women and children were taken away from Guruchas and fed from the captured stock of their tribe. After some time when the fighting was over they were allowed to return to their reserve. Abraham Morris was killed. Those of the leaders left alive were charged with high treason, and imprisoned, though the chief of them, Jacobus Christian, was released in 1924.

The South African Government instituted an inquiry into this matter, a course strongly recommended by the Third Assembly of the League of Nations. The Commission of three Members appointed to conduct the inquiry issued a report, from most points of which one of their number dissented. The views of the majority, in brief, amounts to a conclusion that the conflict was due to misunderstanding and panic on both sides, but that whereas the Whites were to blame for yielding to fear, the Hottentots were not. The Permanent Mandates Commission confirmed this view in July, 1923.

Whichever side was in the wrong it was the natives who suffered massacre and who will remember. For hundreds of years Hottentots will point to the hill of Guruchas and say 'That is where, because we could not pay their tax and were faithful to our chiefs, the white men shot us from the Great Birds and slew men and women and children.' To-day more than ever they must look back to the time before the white invasion; for as far as this race is concerned the new rulers have wasted their opportunity to make a fresh start; to the Hottentots South Africans and Germans must now seem just the same. One is reminded of Kipling's Seal Song:

'I met my mates in the morning, a broken scattered band,
Men shoot us in the water, and club us on the land,
Men drive us to the salt-house, like silly sheep and tame,
Yet still we sing Lukannon – before the sealers came.'

It is clear that no Administration can allow the natives to get out of hand. Only under conditions of law and order can the people regain prosperity. But, at least for the meantime, the interests of the white colonists and those of the natives, in some matters, clash. It cannot be ignored that the Mandatory Government must to some degree take sides. Of course there is obvious good sense in Mr. Hofmeyer's statement 'The person whose desire it is to have an immediate adjustment of all native wrongs and grievances regardless of its effect upon the European people is no friend of the native. European public opinion in South Africa has not yet been educated up to Union standards; in fact it is decidedly hostile thereto, and if it is to be improved *festina lente* is alone the motto under which it can be achieved.' It may be gathered from this that the effect of punishment of employers by the magistrates for ill-treatment of natives would be that afterwards the Whites would reassert their authority by taking it out of the labourers.

The Permanent Mandates Commission in July, 1923, showed itself critical of the Administration of South-west Africa. It spent a long time over the discussion, especially of the Bondelswart Rebellion, but evidently regarded that occurrence as a special symptom of a general disease. It is noticeable that their criticisms are mainly based, not on the Report of the Commission of Inquiry, whose conclusions General Smuts had disavowed in a debate of the

South African Parliament, but on the statements of Mr. Hofmeyer in his reports, or of Major Herbst, his Secretary, who represented the Mandatory Administration at Geneva. The points which are repeatedly emphasized were with regard to the Bondels, a general conviction that the Administrator engaged unnecessarily in hostilities; that the grievances of the natives were real; that once fighting had begun it had to be carried through to the end, and that nothing had been done to alleviate the conditions of the survivors. The consideration of more general application dealt chiefly with labour conditions, and were usually voiced by Sir Frederick Lugard, the British member of the Mandates Commission. For example the implications of the Vagrancy Law are shown by the following passage.

Sir Frederick Lugard inquired whether this law meant that a magistrate had the power to send a person convicted of any offence to any master instead of carrying out the sentence inflicted by the court.

Major Herbst replied that that was so. In the opinion of the Administration it was far better for a man capable of doing useful work to do it, and to receive wages for it, than to serve a term of imprisonment at Government expense.

Sir F. Lugard asked whether a convicted person would be sent to an ordinary farmer and whether in that case that form of labour was popular with the farmers.

Major Herbst said that the answer to both questions was in the affirmative. The farmers were delighted to obtain any form of labour and were frequently to be seen standing outside the magistrate's court waiting for persons up for judgment to be convicted in order to hire them.

This remark must be taken in conjunction with Mr. Hofmeyer's statement that good masters have no difficulty

in hiring workmen, and with Sir Frederick Lugard's inquiries, which revealed that as natives could not obtain payment in cash, they could not possibly pay a money dog-tax, and consequently were liable to prosecution. The Report of the Mandates Commission therefore says, 'This power of imposing forced labour for the benefit of private individuals is a practice which cannot be approved.'

The Rehoboth Affair.

The widespread publicity and criticism aroused by the slaughter of May, 1922, both in South Africa, and through the League machinery, in the world at large, have had a sequel. This relates to what is known as the affair of the Rehoboths. The Rehoboth Bastards (half-castes) were a people enjoying a certain measure of self-rule by old treaty rights. General Botha, during the War, promised to secure their privileges. Under the mandate the existence of this state within a state has always been awkward. Latterly there have been disputes within the tribe, part of which held out for independence and part was willing to co-operate with the Mandatory Administration. There was trouble, too, abou tthe extent of their reserve. A deadlock ensued, and in order to enforce his authority the Administrator took over all powers of Government of the tribe and made a test case of a very unpopular law providing that natives must bring their cattle to be branded by magistrates, having first paid 30*s.* for the branding-irons which they are not allowed to keep. The Rehoboths regarded this as an infringement of their treaty independence and took arms in April, 1925. Then Mr. Hofmeyer, with Union troops and aeroplanes and volunteer Whites of the territory, set out to subdue them. It seemed as though the

Bondelswart massacre might be repeated. But here the similarity ended. The Government forces held their hand and the 600 Rehoboth warriors, realizing that they were outnumbered, surrendered in a body. The leaders were prosecuted, but no blood was shed, and there is little doubt that the moderation observed on this occasion was due to fear of public opinion outside the mandate. The South African Government has appointed a Commission of inquiry to investigate the whole Rehoboth question.

The recurrence of such a slaughter as that of May, 1922, is indeed very unlikely. This much stands to the credit of enlightened opinion in South Africa, and of the world as voiced by the Mandates Commission. But the root cause of the trouble remains and will be slow of eradication. For example, the main source of revenue of the territory is the diamond mines, where there is a heavy rate of mortality among the native labourers – 110 per 1,000 during one period. This figure appears to have been due to an epidemic, but according to the South African representative, country-bred natives are inherently unfit for industrial life. However, the Administration largely subsists on royalties from the mines. Yet when he was asked, in 1925, why a scheme for well-boring in certain native reserves had been abandoned for want of money, Mr. Smit replied that the natives themselves must pay for improvements in their reserves, and that government funds could only be used for works of 'general use.' Presumably this means for works of use to the white community, since a road or a well can only be of general use through serving some particular interest. Again, only 1 per cent of the revenues of the country is spent on the education of the natives or 99 per cent of its population. The point of view

of the government thus is that revenues earned by native labour and loss of life cannot be spent on native welfare, in any reasonable proportion.

The responsibility for this policy falls ultimately upon the Mandatory Power. If South Africa envisaged her mandatory position as one of trustee for the native population, a very different line would be followed. But, of course, it is true that South Africa must serve the white men in the mandated area, too; and what is more to the point, opinion on native policy throughout the Union is riven into opposing blocks. It is on this head, unfortunately, that the Boer and British antagonism is most apt to find expression; it is a century-old cleavage. So that little help may be expected from the Parliament of the Union, where the opposing views on the native question waste their strength in equally-matched debates.

The present position in South-west Africa is succinctly voiced in the Minutes of the Permanent Mandates Commission of 1923.

Sir F. Lugard: 'I think it is clear to anyone who reads this Report that the general feeling of the ignorant farmers was that the natives were there chiefly as labourers for themselves.'

Major Herbst: 'It was not only the ignorant farmers, it was also the educated farmers who thought that.'

Sir F. Lugard: 'That it must have been a great difficulty for the Administration, but I observe that this opinion seems to have been shared by Mr. Hofmeyer, whose views, we are given to understand, are supported by the Mandatory Power.'

The 1923 Report of the Mandates Commission to the League Council therefore says:

'Moral, Social and Material Welfare.'

'The Commission deplores the unfortunate relations which the report discloses between the white population and a large proportion of the natives of the mandated territory. It trusts that the Administration will resist the influence of these deplorable relations which are largely the heritage of past events in South-west Africa and which are so much opposed to the essential principles of Article 22 of the Covenant. It hopes that future reports will be able to disclose better relations between the two races.'

This is the beginning of what must be a long story.

B AND C MANDATES IN AFRICA

CHAPTER ELEVEN: C MANDATES. PACIFIC ISLANDS

'The region of shallow waters and forest-clad islands that lies far east and still mysterious between the deep waters of two oceans.'

JOSEPH CONRAD, '*The Rescue.*'

1. SOUTH SEA ISLANDS

THE Pacific Islands North of the Equator, formerly possessions of Germany, are now mandated to Japan. They are called the South Sea Islands, but are really four groups, the Pelew, Caroline, Marshall and Ladrone Archipelagos; about seven hundred little islands in all. Between those furthest distant from each other lie thousands of miles of sea, but put together they only have a land area of about eight hundred square miles, containing some forty thousand native inhabitants.

This is one of the regions of the world where mystery still lingers. The natives, Micronesians, or 'Kanakas' in the island jargon, are sea-going to some degree. Yet to most of them their island is the world. And to the white man little is known; the seas are imperfectly charted as yet, many of the islets nameless on the map. The men who know most about these parts, missionaries, merchants, most of all captains of the ships that trade from isle to isle, are not the sort to write books or catalogue their wisdom.

The Oriental Mandatory.

Now the people of this ocean empire are to be governed by Japan 'as an integral part of her own possessions.' It will be a curious and interesting study, as the years go on and the annual reports of the Mandatory Powers to the

League accumulate, to compare her methods with those of Australia, Great Britain, and New Zealand, who also hold Pacific Mandates. Japan is a great, a modern and a civilized Power; yet it is only a generation since she suddenly put off her medieval feudalism and assumed ways modelled upon the European system. The Japanese are Oriental still, and much of their ancient habit of mind must remain with them. At the same time they are, in a sense, in a position to experiment in administration more freely than States older in empire. In any case it must be reckoned that they will aim at, and must be tested by, standards different from ours.

Native Conditions.

The problems of native welfare are similar in most Pacific Islands. The natives of this mandate belong chiefly to two races, Kanakas and Chamerros. The numbers of the first race especially and of the population as a whole are declining. This is attributed to decay in tribal customs, bad labour conditions under white men in the past, and – as ever – to 'lack of interest.' There seems no reason, however, that with vigorous medical help, well-regulated labour, and the encouragement of new interests, the rot should not be stopped.

Administration.

Until 1922 the South Sea Islands were occupied by the Japanese Navy. In April of that year the naval occupation was replaced by civil administration under a body called the South Seas Bureau. At its head is a Director, responsible to the Prime Minister of Japan. He has legislative powers as well as full administrative authority. The

capital is on Pelew Island and the Bureau has six territorial districts each governed by a chief official. There is a Japanese court at Pelew, and three subordinate courts in the other groups; the judges have the same qualifications and standing as those in Japan. For tribal cases the island chiefs retain their old judicial powers. Otherwise the native chiefs have defined duties which seem to consist in reporting to the local branch of the Bureau as to their island's administration. Natives and non-natives pay a poll-tax.

Education.

There are separate schools for Japanese and native children. Freedom of religion is practised. Half of the natives have been Christianized, and missionaries are given as many facilities as possible, because the Japanese hold that Christianity is good for the manners and morals of the people. On the other hand, the number of mission schools has greatly diminished since the occupation. The reason given by the Japanese representative to the Mandates Commission is that the natives prefer the higher standard of education offered in the national schools.

Land-tenure.

The land is held according to native custom, and various German regulations regarding alienation have been replaced by a simple decree that natives may not sell land except through the authorities. Such a regulation might possibly work two ways; for although it is intended to save the natives from being swindled out of their land, it could add the lacking of administrative power to a would-be buyer of land. In this connection the Mandates Com-

mission of 1924 asked for detailed particulars regarding the arrangements made in the island of Saipan by a company called the South Sea Development Company, which is running a sugar industry.

There is no slavery nor forced labour in the islands. If any occurred, according to the Japanese Reports, it would be for road-making and cleaning villages. There are phosphate mines in Angaur Island, mostly worked by Chinese and Japanese labour; the conditions of work are being improved; rations and wages have been fixed. If these do not seem to come up to the standards of the West, it must be remembered that Japan is only at the beginning of labour reforms; it is impossible to expect Colonial officials suddenly to adopt ideas which they have never applied to their own people.

The Japanese Reports up to 1924 were short and vague; and the Mandates Commission asked for a fuller account in 1925, particularly regarding expenditure on native welfare. So far the impression is somewhat indefinite, and time will be needed before a complete view can be gathered of what the Mandate really means to these remote and lonely isles.

2. NEW GUINEA

The Islands.

The territory of New Guinea is named after the North-eastern part of the second biggest island of the world. But the area includes about six hundred islands besides, of which the most important are the Bismarck Archipelago and the Northern islands of the Solomon Group. From north to south of these you sail four hundred sea-miles; from east to west eleven hundred. The land area of the

whole is estimated at about 100,000 square miles. The islands are of every shape and kind, mountainous, jungly, ring-shaped, from the great masses like New Britain to the tiniest of atolls. Some of their volcanic forms are strange, many most beautiful. Of New Guinea itself a quarter is totally unexplored by white men. Scarcely anywhere is there a plantation, a government post, or a mission station ten miles inland from the coast. Moreover, it is hardly a white man's country. The islands lie just South of the Equator; the temperature varies very little; it is always hot, always wet and enervating. Malaria is so universal that Europeans suffering from it do not reckon themselves ill; it is merely a normal condition of existence.

Government.

The islands surrendered to Australian forces in 1914. By the New Guinea Act of 1920 civil government was inaugurated. It is in the hands of an Administrator, whose power is limited only by responsibility to the Government of the Commonwealth in matters of important policy. Since 1925 he has been assisted by an Advisory Council, consisting of a director of health, a director of agriculture, a commissioner of native affairs, and a Government secretary. The Council has power to suggest new legislation.

White Inhabitants.

The white population of the islands, numbering about 1,500, are scattered missionaries, planters, prospectors, and the Expropriation Board. This is a body about three hundred strong, charged by Australia with the care of the cocoanut plantations expropriated from German owners. The Commonwealth Government does not seem to be try-

ing to sell those on behalf of the Reparations account, as has been done elsewhere under the Treaty of Peace. The plantations do not pay; in fact the Board is £1,000,000 in debt to Australia. As the trees come into bearing the financial situation may improve, but some critics think that the staff is too large, and the plantation administration wasteful.

The Chinese.

There are nearly as many Chinese as white men. They are the skilled artisans of the Mandate and seem to be prosperous. However, they are hard hit by the immigration laws of Australia, which apply in New Guinea and prevent any further Chinese settlement. This means that they cannot import their wives and families; they say they do not want to marry native women, and they are faced with either a loss of their livelihood in returning to China, or loneliness in New Guinea.

The Natives.

The natives of the islands fall into four racial groups. Papuans, Melanesians, Polynesians and Mieronesians, The Papuans inhabit the interior of New Guinea. There among the mountains has survived a part of the infancy of the human race. The people are as savage as exist anywhere; it seems that cannibalism is practised; and each tiny village is a world to itself, unable to understand the language of its neighbours. In one small island peopled by Papuans there are five hamlets speaking five totally distinct tongues. So far the Government has few contacts with a country of which little is known and much fabled.

The Mieronesians and Polynesians are relatively few in

number, although they are the most civilized of the natives. They are believed to be of Caucasian descent, and have a fairly strong tribal organization under hereditary chiefs.

The Melanesians inhabit New Britain and others of the islands which have been settled and explored; and it is with them that the Mandatory Government has most to do at present. The 1922 Report contains a fascinating survey of some local customs, as they were when the villages were first visited. The people still lived in the Stone Age; their weapons were spears and tomahawks of wood with heads of dark polished stone; they had no cooking pots that would stand fire; but their wooden vessels were finely carved in designs rather like old Celtic work. Each little village was divided into two clans, under chiefs. A man might not marry in his own clan; and his children belonged to his wife's family. So that if he were a chief he would be succeeded not by his son, but probably by his sister's son. On the other hand, he had the life use of part of the land of his own clan; again, his children could not succeed him. This seems an ingenious method of evading the problems of land inheritance.

The grown men belong to a secret society meeting in a masonic lodge. It is from hence that come the masked figures, supposed by the women and boys to be spirits from the bush. Initiation into certain of these societies, such as the Iniat, confers strong magical powers on its members. Magic indeed permeates all life for the islanders. Men and beasts have souls which leave them and roam about during sleep or trance, and after death, and anyone may be attacked by these unseen presences. 'Few, if any, are believed to die from natural causes only; if they

are not killed in wars they are supposed to die from the effects of magic or witchcraft' (The 1922 Report).

Health.

The main activities of the Mandatory Administration, so far, have been concerned with health, education, and labour. The Government is carrying on a serious campaign against the many diseases which afflict the people. For some of these, such as framboesia, the treatment is simple, and native orderlies are trained to administer it. A campaign against hookworm undertaken with the aid of the Rockefeller Foundation has had marked results. The Expropriation Board has granted £10,000 in aid of medical services. There are two methods of approaching this problem. One is cure; and it is evident that there is enormous room for it; the other prevention, which can only be done by raising the standards of the people. This must be a slow development; as it is, the officials preach cleanliness, and discourage practices such as burying the dead under the houses; but effective hygiene depends on a wish to be healthy, and comes by education.

Education.

The great bulk of the education is done by the missions, which combine cultivation for their needs and teaching. The Government has instituted one elementary and one technical school. The latter is interesting; it trains young men as chauffeurs, engineers on small craft, and carpenters.

Labour.

The most urgent task of the Government, however, has

been the regulation of labour conditions. Copra is the only commercial product of the territory, and all the labour is native and indentured. The Mandatory Administration regulates this under Native Labour Ordinance of 1922. This is based upon the view that 'districts open for long periods to recruiters decline in population.' Therefore the Ordinance provides that natives may not be recruited for service out of the Territory except as sailors or for education to Australia. No girl or woman may be recruited save with her husband; on the other hand wives are encouraged to accompany their husbands, and there is an attempt to regulate marriage on plantations. The Administrator may prohibit recruiting in over-drained areas, and may cancel recruiting licences. The licences are limited to recognized chiefs, who are paid a bonus on the recruits they procure. There are regulations for the ships used in recruiting. Natives may be indentured only by the planter whom they are to serve, or by his accredited agent. This is to prevent recruiters hawking labourers round from plantation to plantation. Natives must have a written contract of which a copy is filled with the district office. A minimum wage is fixed which must be paid in cash, not in kind, thus preventing a common means of cheating native labourers. The ordinary contract is for three years; and part of the wages is retained till the end of the period, in order that the labourer may have a lump sum to take home. The plantations themselves are to be inspected by a District Officer. The wholesale flogging of natives practised under the German régime is forbidden; the only punishment which employers may inflict is the withdrawal of a culprit's weekly ration of tobacco.

Difficulties of Government.

It may be that this system, once fairly tried, may prove to be without the deleterious effects of plantation labour hitherto. There is no doubt of the Mandatory Government's honesty of purpose. But the effect of a good law depends entirely on how it is carried out, and there has been a continuous trickle of criticism, sometimes from rather dubious sources, on the treatment of natives in this territory. It must be remembered that the Government has a difficult constituency. The pioneering type of European, who has the spirit to seek his fortune by trading in remote and dangerous lands, has often a 'hard streak.' Every one knows, too, that in the enervating climate of the tropics northern moral standards droop and die in many men; and they unconsciously assimilate the carelessness of suffering common to the savage nature and the savage peoples among whom they live their isolated lives. If too drastic a revolution were imposed upon the planters they could easily, by individual or organized resistance, render the law a dead letter. No Government can impose a law upon a solidly unwilling population unless it declares a state of war and keeps as many soldiers as there are civilians in the country.

Further in this great archipelago of the New Guinea Territory settlements and plantations are so scattered that effective government inspection must be extraordinarily difficult; abuses by single planters, abuses, if such there be, even by a perverse official, must be slow of coming to light, hard to check.

The Ainsworth Report.

The real change in the attitude towards the natives

since the Mandate system came into being, may be gauged by the sensitiveness of the Australian Government to adverse comment. Ten years ago, who would have cared about a few accusations of brutality? But Australia has caused various inquiries to be made regarding specific allegations, and finally, in 1924, asked Major Ainsworth, an experienced Native Affairs Commissioner of Kenya, to tour the territory and make a general report. He drew up a severe review, his criticisms mainly falling under the head of sins of omission. They may be summarized as follows. Too little money is spent on the natives, the officials as a whole lack experience, initiative and knowledge of the native tongues and needs; in particular the Administrator does not tour the islands. The main inherent obstacle to progress is the absence of any real agricultural instinct in the natives. Constructively, Major Ainsworth suggests concentration on agricultural training and the encouragement of native production, which he recognizes will be opposed by the planters.

Reforms.

The Australian Government having invited criticism, took steps with creditable promptness to remedy some of these defects. It has decided to make an annual grant of £10,000 to be used in the interests of the native races. A probation system has been set up for the purpose of securing a properly trained administrative staff, probationers undergoing a course at the new Anthropological Faculty of Sydney University, and also a course of tropical hygiene. The new Advisory Council should also be useful. It has been difficult, of course, for a small population like that of Australia in the hard times after the war to

spend lavishly out of taxation on the territory, and an efficient colonial service can only be created with long practice. The Commonwealth has also revoked a regulation by which the island ports, under her Navigation Laws, were only open to Australian ships. Inexperience faced with ruling some of the most primitive people in the world, accounts for a certain lack of vigour in the early Australian mandatory policy; but there is no reason to think that steady progress will not be made henceforth.

3. NAURU

The Phosphate Mines.

The little island of Nauru lies twenty-six miles South of the Equator. It is shaped like a three-quarters moon, and is about twelve miles round. Only the coast belt bears trees or crops; all the rest is a bare fifty-foot-high plateau. But this plateau is what makes of Nauru an unromantic Treasure Island. It is composed of land with a heavy proportion of phosphate, one of the most valuable fertilizers in the world. So that the treasure is the island itself; and miners dig it up to be shipped away.

From 1888 to 1914 the islet carried the German Flag, and the phosphate was worked by a German company. In 1914 it surrendered, with the other German Pacific Islands, to Australian forces. In 1919 the British Empire purchased the interests of the phosphate company, and the mining rights were vested in three Commissioners, representing Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand. The mines are enormously profitable and will continue to produce for a long time to come. The price at which the phosphate is sold is regulated by the costs of production and a fixed rate of profit. When this is surpassed the price

is lowered. No more need be said of the mines here, however, than that the native owners of the mining land share in the profits. In the German era they received a royalty of ½*d.* per ton of phosphate shipped. Now they are paid £20 an acre for a long lease, and 3*d.* a ton royalty. Of this 1*d.* goes to the Government to be used entirely in the interests of the Nauruans, 2*d.* to the landowners themselves. This system is to be revised in 1927, when it is likely that the natives will ask for an annual rent for their lands and a larger royalty.

The Government.

The government of the island is in the hands of an Australian Administrator, General Griffiths. He is responsible to the Australian Government; and is appointed by it for the first five years. Afterwards the three British States are to arrange between themselves regarding the appointment; but it seems probable that the present system will be continued.

The People.

The Administrator is charged with the welfare of three elements of population. First there are rather over 100 Europeans – Government officials and employees of the Phosphate Company. Then there are about 800 Chinese mine labourers, and 1,200 native Nauruans. An experiment was made of importing natives of New Guinea as miners; but their health went to pieces under the unaccustomed conditions, and they were repatriated.

Chinese.

The Administration concerns itself with the health and conditions of labour of the Chinese workmen. They are

mainly recruited at Hong Kong, by an agent responsible to the Administration, and the housing of the labourers is good. The Government caused the Phosphate Company to replace such of the buildings as were inadequate by June, 1925. The maximum period of indenture is three years, and the Chinese save on their wages; in one year £9,000 savings was sent home to China on their behalf. They have little contact with the natives, save that the Nauruans do a brisk trade in food, especially meat and fruit, with the miners.

Nauruans.

The Nauruans appear to be an attractive, happy-go-lucky people. They live under old custom, in fourteen districts under Chiefs, who elect a Head Chief. The Chiefs meet the Administrator once a month to discuss native affairs. There is also an Advisory Council of two Europeans and two elected Chiefs consulted by the Administrator. The natives run their own co-operative store and savings bank. They live mainly on fish, besides growing yams, coconuts and breeding pigs and fowls, but there is a great lack of fresh vegetables and fruits on the island. To supply this the Administration is going to plant part of the inland plateau with fruit-trees; the Medical Officer thinks that the weak resistance offered by the islanders to disease may be due to an ill-balanced diet.

Education.

The Government in 1922 took over the secular education of the natives, which had previously been in missionary hands. The missions still are charged with the religious up-bringing of the children. The school course is modern, emphasizing physical training and hygiene. The leaving-

age is sixteen, and it is hoped that when it is possible to send promising boys to Australia for further training the island will be able to supply its own skilled workmen and officials.

Leprosy.

Nauru has not escaped the most dreadful scourge of the Islands. Leprosy was imported only recently, but a quarter of the Nauruans are infected now. The medical staff are trying hard to stay the spread of the disease, and to cure the victims. A portion of the coast is set apart for them, and they are given the best treatment known to science. Only, unfortunately, science has not yet found a certain cure for leprosy.

A Modern State.

This little mandated area has been described in detail because it is an entertaining study in modern sociology. In a sense it is a benevolent despotism; in another a socialist State, for the Administration controls every condition of life. Yet the Nauruans are parasitic 'rentiers' living in idleness on money earned for them out of their lands by Chinese wage-slaves. The Chinese, however, do not seem to object; it seems that when they return to China they are eager to re-engage for Nauru. In any case the Reports give the impression that the mandate is thoroughly and successfully administered and the cosmopolitan population well content.

4. WESTERN SAMOA

Climate and Products.

Western Samoa sounds as though it were half an island.

In point of fact it is two islands, Savii and Upolu, with the capital town, Apia, in Upolu. The Mandate is 600 miles North-west of Fiji, and 1,500 North of New Zealand. Distances are so immense in the Pacific that it is hard to grasp them, harder still to imagine how the islanders crossed a vast uncharted sea in their racial wanderings, but these figures are some indication of the remoteness of the territory. The climate is even, hot and damp, as always in this region. Much the most important product is copra, followed at a long distance by cocoa. The islands are fertile, and other economic crops could be grown.

Population.

Samoa surrendered to New Zealand forces in 1914, and were subject to an Administration supported by a garrison till 1920. Then most of the German colonists were repatriated, the troops were withdrawn, and civil government instituted. As in Nauru the Administration has to consider three elements of population: European, Chinese and native. The Europeans are officials, traders, and planters. About a fifth of the land of the islands, formerly in German hands, now count as State domain. The Administration is encouraging companies to take uplands, and individual planters to rent reasonably small holdings; and as times improve there is room for a considerable amount of European production.

Chinese.

The labour on European plantations is Chinese, for the native Samoan does not care to work for wages. The Chinese are indentured at Hong Kong, by a responsible Government recruiter. There are about 900 of them; and their conditions of work and life appear to be satisfactory,

Samoans.

The Samoans are, of course, in the great majority. There are about 35,000 of them, and the rapid increase of population has almost filled up the gap caused by the influenza epidemic of 1918, which killed a fifth of the people. They are described as an attractive race, tall, fine-looking, artistic and cheerful. They are by no means uncivilized, for various missions have worked among them for long, and nearly all of them can read and write in their own language. Education in the New Zealand Government schools has gone through two phases. At first the system stressed the learning of English. But now it is realized that the healthiest ambition for Samoan children is to become good Samoans; and greater emphasis is laid upon instruction in crafts needed by the island. The boys are to be taught agriculture, carpentry and plumbing. The missions still carry on four-fifths of the schools, which are state-aided, and New Zealand makes an annual grant to help to fulfil the growing demand for more education.

Health.

In 1922 the Administrator and the council of native notables agreed that there should be an annual health-tax of £1 per adult male, to be spent on free medical aid for the Samoans. By means of this fund the State health service has been enlarged and improved. The main sicknesses of the islands are eye-disease, framboesia, and parasitical diseases; and the worst drag on the population a heavy infant mortality – 155 per 1,000. Framboesia can be cured by injections, and the Rockefeller Institute is aiding a campaign against hookworm.

Land-tenure.

The land-tenure in Samoa is communal. The allocation of clan-land is controlled by a chief or Matai. The greatest Matai is he who rules most land, and the result is that in spite of quantities of unoccupied bush, neighbouring Matais are constantly engaged in disputes over land. Communal cultivation is always a bad and wasteful system; the whole plantation suffers from the neglect and laziness of the poorest workers, and improvements have to wait upon general consent. The Administration is trying to inoculate the natives with the idea of better cultivation under individual tenure, but, of course, it cannot force a new tribal system upon the people, and it is faced with the massed conservatism of three thousand odd Matais.

Beetles.

Even as it is, three-quarters of the copra output is produced by the Samoans, and its quantity and quality are very much improved of late. This is due to better methods of drying, and especially to a determined campaign against rhinoceros beetles. These beetles destroy the cocoa-nuts, and spread from neglected to well-kept plantations. The only forced labour required of the Samoans has been the production of a quota of beetle corpses and eggs. In each native plantation this work is under the supervision of a Samoan official beautifully entitled the Pulefatoaga or Inspector of Native Plantations and Suppression of Beetle Operations.

Native Share in Government.

The native share in government is considerable. The Matais regulate the affairs of their clans, and each district

has a Faipule or head chief. There is a legislative and advisory council of head chiefs called the Fono of Faipules, which considers all changes in the laws regarding native affairs. The Administration does not pass ordinance over the head of this council, and it is an invaluable channel of Samoan opinion. Some of its members were officially sent to New Zealand in 1925 to see the country which rules them, and others were taken to a neighbouring island to study a different method of land-tenure. It is evident, from the whole tenor of the Mandatory Reports, that the Administration takes the view that advance depends upon Samoan co-operation, and that the confidence of the Samoan leaders must be gained regarding each change. Altogether Western Samoa seems to be a mandated area governed according to the letter of the mandate and the spirit of Article 22.

5. C. MANDATES IN THE PACIFIC



'A sacred trust of civilization.'
Covenant of the League of Nations, Article 22.

THESE are brave words, such as are often spoken over a sinking heart. Often too, by politicians, tongue in cheek. At the end of a survey of mandates there waits a question. Did the men who wrote it, do those who rule under its sanction, mean to clothe this fine phrase of the Covenant with reality?

Doubts.

There are doubts and problems enough, of many kinds, to cloud aspiration; and to some answers can be suggested, to others not. The few that can be included in so slight a study as this must seem a random list, of varying importance too. But it is impossible to reduce them to any connected order.

Sovereignty.

First there is the problem of sovereignty. As the Treaties stand, the ultimate possession of the mandated territories rests with the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. As lately as 1923 the Belgian Government sought the agreement of the United States to the frontier changes in Ruanda-Urundi. But the war-time alliance was an ephemeral combination of States, come together to wage the War and to dictate the Peace. The Allies persist, indeed, as receivers of Reparations and enforcers of ex-enemy demilitarization, but with the lapse or revision of the Treaties those bonds will fray away. Then the only remaining strand will be the joint ownership of the

mandated areas. As a permanent factor in international relations, this would be invidious, as well as a little absurd. Fortunately there is an obvious solution. At a suitable moment, when the United States enter the League of Nations, or are amiably disposed to it, the Allies should consign their treaty rights to the League Council. By its rules, the Mandatories would always attend any discussion of a mandate. The 'neutrals' represented on the Council would help a sound development of international sovereignty. And in 1926 Germany, at all events, will have taken her proper place in the League.

Germany and Mandates.

Yet a seat on the Council and the Mandates Commission, obviously, will not solace a Germany shorn of empire. Nor from the mandatory point of view can she be dispensed with. Her power of organization, and her marvellous research, especially in medical science, should contribute to the price paid by industry for tropical wealth. It is often suggested that Germany should purchase and rule under mandate, part of the vast territories with which Portugal is over-burdened. It is even conceivable that one of the present Mandatories might hand over some area too expensive for its resources. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon the difficulties involved in those alternatives. They seem to be important but not insuperable.

State Domain.

There are two more problems, both with strictly practical implications, bound up with the peculiar status of mandated areas. First, state domain. It is a common theory in law that ownerless land, land, that is, possessed

neither by individuals nor by communities, belongs to the state. In many of the territories the new rulers found themselves endowed with large tracts of domain acquired by the previous governments. But a Mandatory does not possess a mandated area, so that it cannot own its state lands. Here the Mandates Commission have formulated a principle which has been accepted. It is that an administering state has sovereign rights over state domain, but only in its capacity as a Mandatory Government. For instance, France, as the Mandatory for Togo, can dispose of the state lands there, but they do not in any sense belong to the French Government. They belong to the state of Togo; any profit derived from them goes to Togo, not to France, and were the mandate to be transferred they would go with it to the new Administration.

Loans and Investments.

Then there are financial problems. Money is the timidest of creatures. It refuses to enter, it flees away from, a country whose status and future are unsure. Bankers and investors have shown themselves shy of the mandates; 'For,' they say, 'supposing this place changes hands, where will our capital be then?' The Australian Government asked the Mandates Commission to advise on this difficulty, one serious enough to retard the development of the territories. The Commission suggested in July, 1925, 'that the Council, without whose approval no change can take place, will not give such approval unless it has been assured in advance that the new government undertaking the administration of the territory will accept responsibility for the fulfilment of the financial obligations regularly assumed by the former Mandatory Power, and

will engage that all rights regularly acquired under the administration of the former shall be respected. Moreover the Council, when this change has been effected, will continue to use all its influence to secure the fulfilment of these obligations.' This is an extension of a rule already applying to Syria and Palestine.

Lack of Money.

But although it may reassure the shrinking investor, this arrangement will not console the treasuries of the ruling states. It is hard enough in lean times to wring money out of taxpayers for colonies – their colonies – it is far harder to extract it for mandated areas, which are not theirs at all. Yet it must be said that the Mandatory Powers have proved themselves willing to live up to the obligation implied in the Covenant words 'The tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their resources . . . can best undertake this responsibility.' It is a rule that surplus revenue raised by taxation under a mandate must be spent upon the country itself. But, so far, there has been little opportunity to apply it. On the contrary, setting aside military expenditure as in some cases unnecessary, the Mandatories have contributed largely to the territories. A good example of a new kind is the share of the proposed British imperial loan for railway construction in East Africa to be expended in Tanganyika.

None the less, lack of money crops up continually in the Mandatory Reports. Not enough money for schools, not enough money for doctors, not enough money to fight pests, to build roads, to staff provinces. On one occasion a French representative offered, as the reason for the

scarcity of doctors in a French area, the explanation that young men could earn more in France in ordinary practice than the Ministry of Colonies could pay them. France, he implied, could not alter her whole scale of colonial service salaries to tempt doctors to those discomfortable climes. There sticks in the mind, most of all, the tale of the Amani Institute, reduced to selling penny packets of seeds. It can only be hoped that as times improve the mandated areas will be able to ensure adequate governmental expenditure out of their own prosperity.

Lack of Men.

The Mandatory Reports, or some of them, also give an impression that there is a scarcity of capable administrators. The War stopped recruitment for colonial services. Those of Empires like the British and French, with their enormous extension in the territories under mandate, are spread very thin. The British Dominions have to create services where none existed. Moreover, the born colonial official, with the peculiar combination of endowments that makes genius in this kind, is rare. What matters very much more, in ordinary circumstances, is the tradition of a service. Most men are impressionable. While they are learning their work they accept the general views of their colleagues, and later pass them on to their juniors. They will absorb – if they are there to be absorbed – the attributes of good administration, such as incorruptibility, justice, the intention of serving the governed. And the incomplete government of new lands has one advantage; it gives freedom of movement and initiative to an official for a little space, before his feet are all enmeshed in red tape.

The mandatory system in itself should help to form a

good administrative tradition. It ensures a constant, public repetition of aims. Precept upon precept, line upon line, the Mandatory Powers – as governments do – will grow used to believing in the words they speak. More important, the chief administrators of the areas have to furnish a yearly account of their stewardship in relation to the welfare of their people. Now, while all goes well governors may be tempted to regard this as a mere tiresome formality; they may adapt the old Russian saying to 'God is in heaven and the Mandates Commission is far away.' But when things go wrong they discover their mistake. For such actions as the Bondelswarts suppression or the bombardment of Damascus the governments must give a public explanation – a powerful factor in preventing their recurrence. Measures contrary to the mandates texts are noted at Geneva and must be altered to conform. The British, for instance, accepted a ruling of the Mandates Commission regulating their military arrangements in tropical Africa to fit the exact letter of the B texts. The Japanese withdrew a decree which might have been interpreted as the general nationalization of the South Sea Island natives. Even more, when the Mandatories fail to fulfil their obligations, the Commission politely but firmly, from year to year, asks them why. Every session includes examples of this; and the questions tend to come nearer and nearer home. The cumulative effect must be that the hands of the progressive men in the areas are strengthened, by the presumption established between the Mandatories and the League that progress is the object of the system. Thus the mandatory officials are likely to follow sound lines, to be, in fact, good in quality. Numbers must wait for increased prosperity.

League Intervention.

The question of direct intervention of the League Council, in case of maladministration of a mandate, is exceedingly difficult. So far a suggestion during the Sessions of the Mandates Commission, or one embodied in its report to the Council, has been effective in specific cases. But there remains the grave problem of war within a mandated area. The League, by the nature of things, cannot do anything about a sudden and short outbreak except examine the subsequent explanation of the Mandatory. But a long-continued struggle like the Jebel Druse rising in Syria is entirely different.

A summary of League procedure in regard to this affair demonstrates the problem. The rebellion broke out in July, 1925. The League Council of September did not discuss it. The Mandates Commission, meeting in October, had before it the ordinary annual report in Syria up to the end of 1924. The question of the Jebel Druse trouble was raised, but the Commission felt unable to act on the evidence of newspaper reports and decided to hold a special session in February, 1926, to examine an account of the circumstances promised by the French government. This is a fine example of the thoroughness and courage of the Commission. But it means that a war beginning in July, 1925, is not laid before the League Council till March, 1926.

This will scarcely do. The League Council cannot divest itself of its general responsibility for the welfare of the peoples under mandate. Nor can a Mandatory consider such a war as a domestic concern. Yet the League should hold, if possible, to the principle that its rôle is supervisory and that execution rests with the Mandatory.

Again the League Council, most of all in such highly political questions, should delegate the work of criticism to the technical, uninvidious agency of the Mandates Commission.

It may be suggested, tentatively, that the great discrepancy between League responsibility and League action in emergencies is due to lack of correct and prompt information. There is no machinery, as yet, analogous to the obligation of two disputing states to lay their cases before the Council. But if it were part of every Mandatory's obligations, on the outbreak of hostilities or the suspension of ordinary civil law, to report at once to the League, the Mandates Commission could be summoned by the Secretary-General. The Commission should be told of the facts and of the general policy by which the Mandatory meant to secure peace. It should have before it, of course, any petitions or statements from the insurgents. If need be, the Chairman could include in a report a suggestion that the League Council, should meet to recommend possible steps. For example the Council might advise the dispatch to the area of a commission of inquiry, composed of nationals of the governing state, as was done by South Africa in 1922 and 1925. Or the Mandatory might follow the example of the British regarding Mosul and ask for the appointment of a neutral League Commissioner to act as referee. But it is almost certain that the mere necessity to report its action to the Commission would give the spur to any Mandatory inclined to let a war drag on, while if it were doing everything possible to restore peace it would have nothing to fear from publicity.

Hopes: Pooled Experience.

It is a relief to turn from contemplation of the perplexities that beset the path of the mandatory system. Beyond those thorns and briars rises a fair prospect of dreams that may come true. One, indeed, is certain to come true, and that is the spread of knowledge. As between mandatory states it is no longer necessary to depend entirely on the method of trial and error. For the Mandatories can profit by each other's experience, publicly reported. It is to be hoped that this pooling of information will be especially useful in matters of health. In one of the early years, for instance, the Australian report for New Guinea described the cure of framboesia by injections of Novarse nobillon, while the Japanese report for the South Sea Islands said that 'a disease called franpeshi,' for which no cure was known, had been common among the people from time immemorial. Now those two mandated territories are separated by the Equator, 'an imaginary line drawn round the world.' Yet had the Equator been underlined by an ordinary international frontier, knowledge of the remedy might have found it an impassible barrier. As it was, the Japanese representative at the Mandates Commission could not fail to learn of the treatment.

Effectiveness of Agreements.

Again, international measures intended to secure general welfare always involve co-operation between the states which draft them, and, on the spot, between the officials who apply them. As different countries have different ideas, it is sometimes hard to get these conventions carried out, and there is perhaps a tendency to let

them lapse. Mandated territories are included, as part of much wider areas, in the scope of the Convention of St. Germain on Liquor Traffic, the League of Nations Convention in Arms Traffic, the proposed Protocol on Slavery and Forced Labour, and any agreement which may ensue from the inquiry into sleeping-sickness. Here the mandatory system may serve a double purpose. The League is a useful medium for requests for co-operation between officials on mandate frontiers; for requests made in its publicity can hardly be disregarded. Then, each ruling state must answer every year for the fulfilment of international agreements in the mandated territories. There will be, to say the least, a considerable inducement to the States to use in their own neighbouring possessions methods not markedly less humane and efficient than those in the mandated areas. So that the annual reckoning at Geneva ought to pull up the general standard, and secure effectiveness, in time, for agreements which might otherwise fall into desuetude.

Possible Extension.

Now that the Western Powers have set the example of accepting self-imposed limitation of imperial sovereignty there is some possibility of extending the mandatory system to countries it does not now include. This ought to occur in case of the transfer of present territories, if indeed the principle has been established that whole races are not to be bartered about like slaves. Under Articles 18 and 19 of the Covenant States Members of the League, at least, when making new treaties affecting the transfer of lands, should make them in mandatory form. At the same

time it must be recognized that a mandate restricts the rights of the rulers, and as such is not likely to be looked upon with favour by colonial ministries.

One very interesting idea has been thrown out to the Mandates Commission by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, British Under-Secretary for the Colonies. In a discussion on the Masai, the pastoral race inhabiting the South of Kenya Colony and the North of Tanganyika, it came out that the frontier between those areas was largely artificial, and that the people could be much better administered from one centre. Mr. Ormsby-Gore said that he saw no difficulty in making a special Masai reserve and in preparing a special report on that reserve as a whole. This is as much as to suggest that the mandatory system might be extended to a part of a British colony.

That opens up a vista. There is an inevitable stage in imperial government, especially of the evolutionary British sort, when a subject race has been partially educated in self-rule, and desires independence before it is ready for it. It is a troublous phase, full of strain between the rulers, conscious that self-government will mean loss of efficiency and the destruction of good work done, and the ruled, certain that they are being denied their rights. For the sake of good feeling on both sides, in some cases, it might be possible to make plain the aim of eventual independence by entering upon a period of mandate. Then the ruling state would enlist an international witness to its emancipation of the country, and the people would be aware that the Council would not let emancipation be delayed too long. The mandate would serve in fact as a bridge between colony and self-governing dominion.

The League Outside Europe.

The League of Nations is often accused of being preoccupied with European affairs only. To a large extent the charge is true. In the stormy post-war years, the place of the steersman is at the wheel, and Europe is still the wheel that turns the world about. But there is one definite, permanent League concern which is extra-European and world-wide, and that is its work in the supervision of mandates. In Africa, Asia, and the Pacific the League has a statutory interest and a growing influence. Its rôle in those continents is indirect, but it is beneficent and non-partisan; a good prologue to the more leading part it may have to play in the future.

Conclusion.

To anyone reading the mandatory reports it is evident that the rate of construction in the areas, very fast at first, is slowing down. Indeed the change from war to peace, when the same restless human energy that has been used for destruction is turned to rebuilding, must always seem like a miracle. Most remarkable work has been done in mandated territories which were theatres of war, like Palestine; but even in the Pacific islands, where the War only meant stagnation, peace has seen a renaissance of prosperity. Yet while the sight of a seedling in a felled forest makes the heart leap up, a young plantation suggests rather a long patience. Soon, the mandatory system will have reached the period of steady, gradual growth. Its principles are defined already; the fine work of the Mandates Commission has ensured its actuality in international affairs; its application in the territories, on the whole, is well begun. But it will be long enough before

it comes to perfection, and in the meantime the surest guarantee of its sound development would be general interest and knowledge. For mandatory rulers and mandated races are no more, in the end, than men and women, living according to the wishes of their hearts and the ideas in their heads. With them lies the fulfilment of the ideal of the sacred trust of civilization, and if it is widely known and accepted they will translate it into reality.

APPENDIX I

A FAIRLY TYPICAL MANDATE

BRITISH MANDATE FOR TOGOLAND

The Council of the League of Nations:

Whereas by Article 119 of the Treaty of Peace with Germany signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919, Germany renounced in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights over her oversea possessions, including therein Togoland; and

Whereas the Principal Allied and Associated Powers agreed that the Governments of France and Great Britain should make a joint recommendation to the League of Nations as to the future of the said territory; and

Whereas the Governments of France and Great Britain have made a joint recommendation to the Council of the League of Nations that a mandate to administer, in accordance with Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, that part of Togoland lying to the west of the line agreed upon in the Declaration of July 10, 1919, referred to in Article 1, should be conferred upon His Britannic Majesty; and

Whereas the Governments of France and Great Britain have proposed that the mandate should be formulated in the following terms; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has agreed to accept the mandate in respect of the said territory, and has undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in accordance with the following provisions;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows:

Article 1

The territory for which a mandate is conferred upon His Britannic Majesty comprises that part of Togoland which lies to the west of the line laid down in the Declaration signed on July 10, 1919, of which a copy is annexed hereto.

This line may, however, be slightly modified by mutual agreement between His Britannic Majesty's Government and the Government of the French Republic where an examination of the localities shows that it is undesirable, either in the interests of the inhabitants or by reason of any inaccuracies in the map Sprigade 1 : 200,000, annexed to the Declaration, to adhere strictly to the line laid down therein.

The delimitation on the spot of this line shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the said Declaration.

The final report of the Mixed Commission shall give the exact description of the boundary line as traced on the spot; maps signed by the Commissioners shall be annexed to the report. This report with its annexes shall be drawn up in triplicate; one of these shall be deposited in the archives of the League of Nations, one shall be kept by His Britannic Majesty's Government, and one by the Government of the French Republic.

Article 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for the peace, order and good government of the territory, and for the promotion to the utmost of the material and moral well-being and the social progress of its inhabitants.

Article 3

The Mandatory shall not establish in the territory any military or naval bases, nor erect any fortifications, nor organize any native military force except for local police purposes and for the defence of the territory.

Article 4

The Mandatory:

(1) shall provide for the eventual emancipation of all slaves, and for as speedy an elimination of domestic and other slavery as social conditions will allow;

(2) shall suppress all forms of slave trade;

(3) shall prohibit all forms of forced or compulsory labour, except for essential public works and services, and then only in return for adequate remuneration;

(4) shall protect the natives from abuse and measures of fraud and force by the careful supervision of labour contracts and the recruiting of labour;

(5) shall exercise a strict control over the traffic in arms and ammunition and the sale of spirituous liquors.

Article 5

In the framing of laws relating to the holding or transfer of land, the Mandatory shall take into consideration native laws and customs, and shall respect the rights and safeguard the interests of the native population.

No native land may be transferred, except between natives, without the previous consent of the public authorities, and no real rights over native land in favour of non-natives may be created except with the same consent.

The Mandatory shall promulgate strict regulations against usury.

Article 6

The Mandatory shall secure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations the same rights as are enjoyed in the territory by his own nationals in respect of entry into and residence in the territory, the protection afforded to their person and property, and acquisition of property, moveable and immoveable, and the exercise of their profession or trade, subject only to the requirements of public order, and on condition of compliance with the local law.

Further, the Mandatory shall ensure to all nationals of States Members of the League of Nations, on the same footing as to his own nationals, freedom of transit and navigation, and complete economic, commercial and industrial equality; except that the Mandatory shall be free to organize essential public works and services on such terms and conditions as he thinks just.

Concessions for the development of the natural resources of the territory shall be granted by the Mandatory without distinction on grounds of nationality between the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations, but on such conditions as will maintain intact the authority of the local Government.

Concessions having the character of a general monopoly shall not be granted. This provision does not affect the right of the Mandatory to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in the interest of the territory under mandate and in order to provide the territory with fiscal resources which seem best suited to the local requirements; or, in certain cases, to carry out the development of natural resources, either directly by the State or by a controlled agency, provided that there shall result therefrom

no monopoly of the natural resources for the benefit of the Mandatory or his nationals, directly or indirectly, nor any preferential advantage which shall be inconsistent with the economic, commercial and industrial equality hereinbefore guaranteed.

The rights conferred by this article extend equally to companies and associations organized in accordance with the law of any of the Members of the League of Nations, subject only to the requirements of public order, and on condition of compliance with the local law.

Article 7

The Mandatory shall ensure in the territory complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship which are consonant with public order and morality; missionaries who are nationals of States Members of the League of Nations shall be free to enter the territory and to travel and reside therein, to acquire and possess property, to erect religious buildings and to open schools throughout the territory; it being understood, however, that the Mandatory shall have the right to exercise such control as may be necessary for the maintenance of public order and good government, and to take all measures required for such control.

Article 8

The Mandatory shall apply to the territory any general international conventions applicable to his contiguous territory.

Article 9

The Mandatory shall have full powers of administration and legislation in the area subject to the mandate.

This area shall be administered in accordance with the laws of the Mandatory as an integral part of his territory and subject to the above provisions.

The Mandatory shall therefore be at liberty to apply his laws to the territory subject to the mandate with such modifications as may be required by local conditions, and to constitute the territory into a customs, fiscal or administrative union or federation with the adjacent territories under his sovereignty or control, provided always that the measures adopted to that end do not infringe the provisions of this mandate.

Article 10

The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council, containing full information concerning the measures taken to apply the provisions of this mandate.

Article 11

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

Article 12

The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Members of the League.

Done at London, the twentieth day of July one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.

Certified true copy:

SECRETARY-GENERAL.

APPENDIX II

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